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Security audit

my_send_email

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This email skill does what it says, but it embeds a live-looking SMTP password and sends email externally without enough user control or scoped runtime configuration.

Review before installing. This skill can send email outside your environment using an embedded SMTP account password, and it does not ask for confirmation before sending. The publisher should rotate the exposed password, move credentials to protected runtime configuration, use a package-relative entry point, and add explicit confirmation and recipient checks before external sends.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Tool Hijacking and SpoofingModifies or replaces tools so legitimate-looking calls execute attacker logic
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
send_mail.py:7
Finding

Hard-Coded SMTP Credentials Expose the Email Account

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T07 · Tool Hijacking and Spoofing

Error
Location
_meta.json:8
Finding

Skill Metadata Invokes an External, Unbundled Script Path

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill lacks any warning or safeguard about sending messages to external recipients, even though email can transmit sensitive information outside the organization. In this context, the absence of disclosure, validation, or confirmation materially increases the risk of accidental exfiltration and user-unaware outbound communication.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases are broad enough to match ordinary user requests to notify or contact someone, which can cause this email-sending skill to activate unexpectedly. Because the skill performs an external side effect (sending email), unintended invocation can lead to data disclosure, spam, or actions taken without sufficiently explicit user intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill description uses broad trigger phrases such as 'user asks to send an email' and 'notify via email,' which can overlap with many normal conversational requests. In an agentic environment, this increases the chance the skill is invoked too readily, enabling unintended outbound communication or data exfiltration through email when the user did not explicitly consent to sending a message.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill sends arbitrary user-provided content to an external SMTP server immediately, with no confirmation, consent flow, or warning that data will leave the local environment. In an agent setting, this creates a real exfiltration path for sensitive prompts, generated content, or user data if the tool is invoked unexpectedly or with attacker-influenced inputs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The natural-language comments, usage text, and return messages are presented only in Chinese, with no indication that the user can choose another language or that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-only context. This creates a locale policy issue because the skill effectively enforces one language without opt-in or justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.