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Security audit

LGD Badge Issuer(LGD 徽章签发器)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill can issue compliance badges even when supplied evidence says the checks failed, undermining its advertised safeguards.

Treat generated badges as local records, not verified compliance credentials. Before using this in an approval or audit workflow, require validated passing results tied to the holder, record all refusals, and correct the CLI documentation. Use a dedicated output directory and avoid symbolic links. The review found concrete certification and audit weaknesses, but no evidence of exfiltration or malicious intent.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (5)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The advertised qualification gate is stronger than the implementation: evidence labels suffice for issuance without verifying successful assessments, and malformed evidence exits without a refusal record. Because this skill produces compliance credentials, these discrepancies allow unsupported certification and undermine the promised audit trail.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Issuance checks only evidence-key prefixes, not whether the three law checks passed.

High
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

The gate checks only that caller-supplied keys cover the l1-, l2-, and l3- prefixes; arbitrary inline values, empty values, or nonexistent file references can satisfy it. Hashing those values proves neither that assessments occurred nor that they passed, allowing unsupported credentials that downstream compliance consumers may trust.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tainted flow: 'reg' from pathlib.Path.read_text (line 59, file read) → pathlib.Path.write_text (file write)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/badge_issuer.py (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

python
def save_reg():
        reg_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
        reg_path.write_text(json.dumps(reg, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")

    now = datetime.datetime.now().isoformat(timespec="seconds")
    if missing:

Tainted flow: 'cert' from pathlib.Path.read_text (line 76, file read) → pathlib.Path.write_text (file write)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/badge_issuer.py (reported line 93)May include surrounding context.

python
if a.out:
        outp = pathlib.Path(a.out)
        outp.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
        outp.write_text(json.dumps(cert, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2), encoding="utf-8")

    if a.json:
        print(json.dumps({"issued": True, "cert": cert, "out": a.out}, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))

Unconditional triggers include generic approval and rejection requests unrelated to LGD certification.

Low
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to load it whenever any listed phrase matches, including "reject a failed application and log why." That phrase does not require an LGD or three-laws context and could activate the badge issuer for unrelated application workflows, despite the narrower purpose described earlier.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.