judging-rubric-grader

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 18, 2026 · 10:36 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This is a small local contest-scoring helper that matches its stated purpose and does not show hidden access, persistence, or data exfiltration behavior.

Before installing, confirm that a Chinese-language contest rubric helper fits your workflow and treat its scores only as decision support. It does not appear to send data anywhere or modify the system, but organizers should still verify the rubric and final decisions manually.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Behavioral AST: exec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (4)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Confidence: 88% confidence
• Finding: This markdown file presents the skill name, title, and user-facing documentation entirely in Chinese, and does not indicate that the user can select another language. Under the policy rule for language or locale constraints, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy concern.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Confidence: 91% confidence
• Finding: The skill's user-facing docstring, CLI descriptions, help text, error messages, and output notes are entirely in Chinese, with no indication that other languages are supported or that the user can opt in to this locale. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user choice is a natural-language policy violation.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Confidence: 85% confidence
• Finding: Line L18 states that the documentation is in Chinese only ("中文文档见 `SKILL.md`") without indicating any user language choice or alternative locale. This can be a natural-language policy issue because it effectively forces a specific language for users who need the primary instructions.

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low

• Category: Dangerous Code Execution

Content

out_list.append({"tool": META["slug"], "input": d, "errors": [str(e)], "rc": 2, "aigc_mark": AIGC})
        print(json.dumps(out_list, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))
        sys.exit(0 if allok else 2)
    args = {k: getattr(ns, k) for k in argnames}
    try:
        res, rc = _run(args)
    except GateError as e:

• Confidence: 50% confidence
• Finding: Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.