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Security audit

hgrac-route-checker

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a small, disclosed regulatory decision-support CLI with no evidence of hidden access, persistence, data collection, or remote execution.

Installers should treat the tool as a narrow compliance aid, not as legal advice. Verify any result against current official regulations and note that the interface and detailed documentation are primarily in Chinese.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
The natural-language strings, CLI descriptions, errors, and outputs are entirely in Chinese, and the file does not indicate that language choice is optional or that the tool is intentionally limited to a Chinese-only audience. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy concern.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The text states '中文文档见 `SKILL.md`', indicating the skill documentation is provided in Chinese only. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without user choice can be a natural-language policy violation unless clearly justified as region-specific.

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
out_list.append({"tool": META["slug"], "input": d, "errors": [str(e)], "rc": 2, "aigc_mark": AIGC})
        print(json.dumps(out_list, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2))
        sys.exit(0 if allok else 2)
    args = {k: getattr(ns, k) for k in argnames}
    try:
        res, rc = _run(args)
    except GateError as e:
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.