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Security audit

Evidence Chain Builder(AI 论断有证证据链)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill processes evidence supplied by the user, with inconsistent permission declarations but no observed hidden access or harmful behavior.

Use only input files you intend to share with the agent, and enforce file-access limits in the host rather than relying on filesystem:false. The permission declarations should be corrected. Treat the score as a summary of supplied source labels and verify original sources yourself. All bundled files were inspected; runtime sandbox behavior remains unverified.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The manifest declares filesystem access disabled while advertising file-reading tools and a CLI whose JSON import reads local files. This understates the skill's actual access requirements and can mislead permission-based review or deployment; it does not demonstrate a bypass of an independently enforced filesystem sandbox.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The JSON import option reads local files despite the manifest explicitly disabling filesystem access.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The --from option passes a caller-controlled path directly to open(), despite the declared prohibition on filesystem access. If executed with broader host permissions, it can read any accessible path, with selected fields from compatible JSON exposed in output; ordinary user-authorized imports are legitimate, and no network exfiltration or sandbox escape is shown.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.