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Security audit

AI Building AI Governance(AI造AI治理与安全)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill provides AI governance guidance and simple offline tools, with minor limitations in its bundled audit and reporting.

Suitable as an offline governance reference, not a security certification or enforcement system. Optional verification replaces bundled report files. Its self-audit, scores, and outdated manifest hash do not establish independent assurance; verify substantive governance claims before relying on them. This review inspected the supplied files without executing the scripts or authenticating external publisher sources.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (4)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/02-编码智能体治理.md (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

md
- 编码智能体专用沙箱(禁网络/禁写敏感路径)

### 2.3 越权与破坏面
- Agent 自主执行 `rm`、`git push --force`、改生产配置
- 超出仓库范围读写其他目录
- 缓释:最小权限工作区 + 命令白名单 + 高危操作人工确认(两阶段提交)

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · verify/ai_building_ai_quality_test.py (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

python
def run_tool(args, timeout=30):
    try:
        r = subprocess.run([PY, os.path.join(TOOLS, "aibuild_toolkit.py")] + args,
                           capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)
        return r.returncode, r.stdout or ""
    except Exception as e:

The verifier silently creates or overwrites verify/security_results.json without disclosing the file write.

Low
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Opening the fixed output path in write mode truncates any existing results file. The module docstring describes local verification and the console output reports scores, but neither discloses that a persistent report will be created or replaced.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.