T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Note
- Location
requirements.txt:1- Finding
Unpinned Runtime Dependencies Permit Unreviewed Package Versions
- Content
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=2.28.0 python-dotenv>=1.0.0 ``` The documented installation process in `README.md:7` executes: ```bash pip install -r requirements.txt ``` ### Technical Analysis Both dependencies use unrestricted lower-bound version constraints. A new installation can therefore retrieve any later release available from the configured package index without ensuring that it is the version reviewed during development or audit. No malicious or misspelled dependency was identified in the current package. However, the absence of exact version pins, a lock file, and package hashes makes installation results non-reproducible and leaves the project exposed to compromised future releases, package-index compromise, or unexpected security regressions. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a permitted future release of one of the declared packages or the package distribution channel. 2. A user follows the documented `pip install -r requirements.txt` procedure. 3. Because only a minimum version is specified, `pip` resolves and installs the compromised release. 4. Malicious installation hooks or imported runtime code execute with the privileges of the user running the installation or Skill. 5. The compromised dependency could access the process environment, including the RAGFlow API key, or alter outbound requests and responses. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation would run dependency-controlled code with the privileges of the user executing the installation or Skill. Within that context, it could read environment variables, access files available to the process, intercept tax queries and RAGFlow responses, or make unauthorized network requests. This finding does not establish that the currently named packages are malicious. ]]>- Remediation
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