T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:15- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package and Source Installation
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 15-25
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and mutable third-party dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash npm install -g agent-browser agent-browser install agent-browser install --with-depsbash git clone https://github.com/vercel-labs/agent-browser cd agent-browser pnpm install pnpm build agent-browser installTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions globally install
agent-browserwithout pinning an audited version or verifying package integrity. The alternative source-based procedure clones the repository's mutable default branch without selecting a reviewed commit or release tag, then installs dependencies and executes a build.Both installation paths may execute package lifecycle scripts and other upstream-controlled installation logic. Consequently, the code that runs during installation can differ from the content reviewed when this skill was published. The
--with-depsoption may additionally invoke operating-system dependency installation, increasing the potential effect where the environment grants package-manager or administrative privileges.This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the named upstream package is currently malicious.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the npm package, an upstream maintainer account, the source repository, or a transitive dependency.
- The attacker publishes malicious package content or modifies the repository's mutable default branch.
- A user follows the documented global npm installation or source-build procedure.
- npm or pnpm retrieves the attacker-controlled content and may execute its lifecycle, build, or installation scripts.
- The malicious code executes with the permissions of the invoking user.
- If installation is performed with administrative privileges or system dependency installation receives elevated authorization, the compromise may extend to system-leve ...[truncated 725 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
agent-browserto a specifically reviewed version instead of installing the latest release:bash npm install --global agent-browser@<reviewed-version> - Pin source installations to a verified commit hash or signed release tag:
bash git clone https://github.com/vercel-labs/agent-browser cd agent-browser git checkout --detach <verified-commit-hash> - Publish expected package integrity hashes or signature-verification instructions and require verification before installation.
- Use a committed lockfile with integrity metadata for source builds, and require frozen or immutable dependency installation.
- Prefer a project-local installation in an isolated container or restricted environment over a global installation.
- Review package lifecycle scripts, build scripts, and transitive dependencies before execution. Where supported, initially install with lifecycle scripts disabled and explicitly run only audited setup steps.
- Avoid running npm, pnpm, or the browser installer as root. Clearly document when
--with-depsmay request elevated privileges and provide a separately reviewed list of required operating-system packages. - Periodically re-audit the pinned release and update the pin only after reviewing upstream and dependency changes.
- Pin
