T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
claw.json:169- Finding
Sensitive device information can be accessed without user confirmation
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill appears purpose-built for Android remote control, but it needs Review because several sensitive reads and device-changing actions are not clearly gated and some safety claims contradict the exposed tools.
Install only if you understand that this can remotely view and control a connected Android phone through a third-party service. Before use, verify every sensitive action yourself, avoid pasting TUTU_API_TOKEN or serial numbers into chat, and treat screenshots, notifications, files, logs, screen recordings, and setting changes as sensitive even when the platform does not show a confirmation prompt.
claw.json:169Sensitive device information can be accessed without user confirmation
claw.json:323Ungated device reconnaissance enables detailed profiling
claw.json:224High-impact device mutations and screen recording are not confirmation-gated
SKILL.md:835Mandatory workflow contradicts the environment-only credential policy
The trigger set contains broad everyday terms that are likely to match ordinary conversations, causing this highly privileged remote-control skill to activate unintentionally. In the context of a phone-control skill with access to screenshots, messages, files, calls, and settings, accidental invocation materially raises the chance of privacy-invasive or destructive actions being proposed or executed.
The capability descriptions enumerate access to sensitive data and powerful actions—SMS, contacts, call logs, GPS, notifications, screenshots, files, app management, and network controls—without consistently placing user-facing warnings and consent requirements adjacent to each capability. Because this skill operates on a personal mobile device, weak inline disclosure increases the risk of users not understanding the privacy and safety implications of activation.
The skill claims it has no system-setting write capability and only supports read-only queries, yet it exposes multiple mutating actions such as set_brightness, set_volume, set_rotation, set_wifi, set_bluetooth, set_airplane_mode, set_screen_timeout, and set_wallpaper. This is dangerous because users and downstream reviewers may rely on false safety claims while the skill can materially alter device state and availability.
The description and all invocation guidance are written as mandatory Chinese-language instructions for using the skill, while also including generic English triggers like "phone" and "android". There is no statement that the skill is China-only or Chinese-only, nor any opt-in or alternative language support, which creates a locale-policy concern.
The skill transmits device control commands and highly sensitive artifacts such as screenshots to an external service endpoint, which is an actual external data transmission path. In this context, screenshots can reveal messages, MFA codes, contacts, and other private content, so the external transmission is security-relevant even if it is the intended architecture.
curl -s -X POST https://www.szs.chat/api/phone_action.php \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TUTU_API_TOKEN" \
-d '{"action":"screenshot"}'
The workflow says the user must provide a Token and SN, but earlier sections explicitly say the token is injected from the environment and SN is unnecessary. This inconsistency can cause the agent to solicit credentials in chat, increasing the risk of secret exposure and mishandling of device identity data.
The document says there is no unlock capability and only read-only lock-state inspection, but an example explicitly instructs waking the screen and swiping up to bypass simple lock screens. Even if this does not defeat PIN/password locks, it still contradicts the stated trust boundary and can enable interaction with an unsecured device without clearly communicating that behavior.
The manifest describes remote control, GUI automation, system management, communications, and reading device state, but does not justify falsifying device state for other apps. Mock-location injection is a distinct capability that can influence external app behavior and is not an obvious requirement for normal phone control.
The manifest emphasizes remote Android control, GUI automation, communications, status, and sandboxed file operations on existing device storage. Downloading arbitrary files from URLs introduces a content-ingestion capability that is not clearly described as part of the skill’s purpose and is broader than local file management.
The skill description is written entirely in Chinese, including setup, safety guidance, and usage instructions, with no indication that alternative languages are available. Under the policy for natural-language violations, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a locale/language policy issue.
The trigger '手机' is extremely broad and likely to appear in many unrelated conversations. Because this skill grants remote control over an Android device, even low-friction accidental activation increases privacy and safety risk.
The trigger '微信' is a common app name that may appear in ordinary discussion unrelated to remote device control. For a privileged phone-control skill, this creates unnecessary activation risk.
The trigger '抖音' is a common everyday term in user chats and can invoke the skill without clear automation intent. That is unsafe given the skill's high privileges over phone state and content.
The trigger '淘宝' is too generic for a high-privilege control skill and may match benign shopping discussions. This broadens the attack surface for accidental invocation.
The trigger '京东' is a common app or shopping reference and does not by itself express intent to control a device. Accidental matching is therefore plausible.
The trigger '电量' is a generic term that can appear in many contexts, causing overbroad activation. For a skill with access to phone telemetry and controls, this is an avoidable risk.
The trigger '短信' is broad and can match ordinary discussion about text messages without indicating consent to access device SMS data. That is especially sensitive in this skill's context.
The trigger '定位' is a common term that may be used abstractly or conversationally, yet this skill can access live GPS location. Broad matching therefore increases privacy risk.
The trigger '位置' is even broader than '定位' and may appear in many non-device-control contexts. This can accidentally route users into a skill with sensitive location access.
The trigger '通知' is generic and could match many unrelated requests about notifications conceptually rather than phone access. Given the skill can read system notifications, accidental invocation carries privacy implications.
The trigger '震动' is a short everyday term that does not inherently indicate a request to control a phone remotely. This weakens intent verification.
The trigger '语音' is highly generic and may match many unrelated discussions. In a skill that can perform TTS and broader phone control, that is unnecessarily permissive.
The trigger '媒体' is broad and ambiguous, making unintentional activation plausible. This is avoidable for a high-privilege skill.
The trigger '存储' is generic and often used outside remote-phone-control contexts. With file-management capabilities, accidental routing could expose private data handling flows.
The trigger '截图' is a common term that may refer to many platforms or contexts, not necessarily controlling a connected Android device. This can cause unintended activation of a sensitive skill.
No suspicious patterns detected.