T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/chatbi/config.py:35- Finding
Enterprise Queries and Results Transmitted over Cleartext HTTP
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/chatbi/config.py:35; request usage atscripts/chatbi/client.py:45-52andscripts/chatbi/client.py:109-115
Vulnerability Type: Cleartext transmission of potentially sensitive enterprise data
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
scripts/chatbi/config.py:35:python api_url: str = "http://llmapp-prod.testsite.woa.com/api/v1/chatflows/80fbae66-9abc-42ed-8270-5ec0bcd5e526/prediction"scripts/chatbi/client.py:45-52:python with requests.post( self._config.api_url, headers=headers, json=payload, stream=True, timeout=(self._config.connect_timeout, self._config.read_timeout), ) as resp: resp.raise_for_status()scripts/chatbi/client.py:109-115:python resp = requests.post( self._config.api_url, headers=headers, json=payload, timeout=(self._config.connect_timeout, self._config.read_timeout), ) resp.raise_for_status() return resp.json()Technical Analysis
The default ChatBI endpoint uses unencrypted HTTP. Both streaming and non-streaming requests send their complete JSON payload to this endpoint without TLS transport protection.
The payload can contain natural-language enterprise-data questions, user and workspace identifiers, table identifiers, generated SQL context, and dialogue metadata. Responses can contain selected table names, generated SQL statements, query results, execution details, and final answers.
HTTP provides neither transport confidentiality nor cryptographic server authentication. An attacker with a network position between the client and server can therefore observe or modify requests and responses. The parser trusts successfully decoded response events and displays their contents without an independent authenticity check, allowing a man-in-the-middle attacker to inject forged SQL, query results, or final answers.
Attack Path
- A use ...[truncated 1324 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace the default endpoint with an HTTPS URL served using a valid, trusted TLS certificate.
- Validate the URL scheme during configuration initialization and reject non-HTTPS endpoints by default.
- If cleartext HTTP is required for isolated development, require an explicit option such as
--allow-insecure-httpand display a prominent warning. - Keep certificate verification enabled and do not introduce
verify=False. - Consider restricting permitted endpoint hosts to an approved allowlist to reduce accidental data disclosure to arbitrary destinations.
- Use authenticated requests or signed responses where supported so the client can verify the service identity and response integrity.
- Avoid exposing sensitive query results in verbose logs and raw-event files unless explicitly requested and securely stored.
