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Security audit

magic-text2video

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This text-to-video skill has a coherent purpose, but its instructions and client create avoidable risks around local command execution and API-key exposure.

Review before installing. Use only non-sensitive text, rotate MAGIC_API_KEY if this client was used on untrusted networks, and do not run the documented shell command with raw user text. The publisher should restore normal TLS verification and change the invocation guidance to pass text through a structured no-shell argument API or stdin.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/media_gen_client.py:50
Finding

TLS Certificate and Hostname Verification Disabled

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:47
Finding

Shell Command Injection Through Documented User-Text Interpolation

Content
View full analysis
/tmp/proof)`. 2. Following `SKILL.md`, the Agent substitutes that text into the documented double-quoted `--text` argument. 3. The shell evaluates `$(id > /tmp/proof)` before starting the Python process. 4. The injected command executes with the operating-system permissions of the Agent or t ...[truncated 1070 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (6)

Tainted flow: 'req' from os.environ.get (line 55, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This is a real security issue, primarily because TLS certificate validation and hostname verification are explicitly disabled before sending the request. That means the Bearer API key and user-supplied prompt can be intercepted or modified by a man-in-the-middle attacker, making the environment-to-network taint especially dangerous in this skill because it handles credentials for a remote service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/media_gen_client.py (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

python
ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
        ctx.check_hostname = False
        ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout_s, context=ctx) as resp:
            raw = resp.read().decode("utf-8")
            return json.loads(raw) if raw else {}
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes Python code that uses both an environment-provided API key and outbound network access, but it declares no explicit tool scope or allowed-tools boundary. This weakens policy enforcement and reviewability, increasing the risk that the skill can access capabilities beyond what users or operators expect.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill tells the agent to submit user-provided text to a remote video service, but the user-facing description does not clearly warn that their prompt content will leave the local environment over an API call. This can cause inadvertent disclosure of sensitive or regulated text because users may reasonably assume the content is processed locally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The client sends the user-provided --text value to a remote service and includes a bearer API key in the request, but there is no confirmation prompt or explicit user-facing warning in the CLI help or output that data will be transmitted off-system. For a code file, network transmission of user or system data should have some visible disclosure unless already clearly warned elsewhere.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The invocation examples are written only in Chinese, which imposes a language-specific interaction pattern without stating that the skill is region-specific or offering alternative language options. Under the language/locale policy, skills should either allow user choice or clearly justify a locale restriction.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The top-level parser description on L129 says "image & video generation," but every implemented subcommand in this file is limited to video-create, video-status, and video-wait. This is an active documentation mismatch about the tool's capabilities rather than a mere omission.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.