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Security audit

Auto Workflow 1.0.0

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This automation skill is useful in concept, but it tells the agent to build and run automation without waiting for the user to ask or approve it.

Install only if you are comfortable with an automation skill that may push the agent toward writing scripts, configs, scheduled jobs, or outbound workflows. Before use, require the agent to present a plan, list files, commands, schedules, data sources, and destinations, and wait for explicit approval before making changes or sending anything.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:41
Finding

Unsolicited Automation Through Skill Instruction Hijacking

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 41-47
Vulnerability Type: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: High

Complete vulnerable segment, translated into English:

text
Rather than "answering the question," the approach is "detect repetition and immediately build automation."

When repetitive operations are encountered:
- Ask yourself: Can this be written as a script?
- Ask yourself: Can this run automatically next time?
- Act directly without waiting for the user to request it.

Technical Analysis

The skill explicitly redirects the agent from responding to the user's stated request toward autonomously implementing automation. The instruction to act without waiting for a user request removes an essential authorization boundary.

If the hosting agent exposes file-writing, command-execution, scheduling, system-inspection, or messaging tools, this directive could cause it to create scripts or configurations and initiate recurring or outbound operations without informed consent. The broad activation language elsewhere in the skill increases the possibility that an ordinary discussion of repetitive work will trigger this behavior.

The package contains no executable scripts, dependencies, remote payloads, or embedded commands. The vulnerability is therefore instruction-driven, and its practical impact depends on the tools and privileges available to the agent at runtime.

Attack Path

  1. A user mentions a repetitive task or asks how to save time.
  2. The broad skill trigger activates auto-workflow.
  3. Lines 41-47 redirect the agent from providing advice to immediately implementing automation.
  4. The agent uses any available tools to write scripts, modify configuration, create a recurring workflow, collect data, or prepare outbound actions.
  5. These operations may occur without the user approving the implementation, persistence mechanism, data access, or external tran ...[truncated 1099 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace the autonomous-action directive with a requirement to present an automation proposal before making changes.
  2. Require explicit user confirmation before writing files, executing commands, modifying configuration, creating schedules, accessing credentials, collecting sensitive data, or sending information externally.
  3. Separate planning from execution so that initial activation produces only a proposed workflow, required permissions, expected side effects, and rollback plan.
  4. Require an additional confirmation for persistent or recurring automation, including scheduled tasks and startup execution.
  5. Apply least-privilege controls to all tools exposed to the skill and deny capabilities unrelated to the approved workflow.
  6. Use preview or dry-run behavior by default and display exact commands, files, destinations, schedules, and data sources before execution.
  7. Add rollback instructions and require validation in an isolated or limited-scope environment before production deployment.
  8. Replace the vulnerable instruction with language such as: “When repetitive work is detected, suggest an automation design. Do not implement, execute, schedule, or transmit anything until the user explicitly approves the proposed actions and permissions.”
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases ('automate', 'save time', 'reduce manual work', 'repeated tasks') are broad and likely to match many ordinary requests, causing the skill to activate in contexts where automation is not actually desired. Because this skill can lead to script generation and workflow execution, overbroad invocation materially raises the chance of inappropriate or premature automation guidance.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill body is written entirely in Chinese while the manifest header and surrounding instructions are in English, and the file does not state that Chinese is optional or region-specific. This creates an implicit language constraint without user opt-in, which matches the language/locale policy violation criteria.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly encourages taking action ('直接做,不等用户要求' / 'do it directly, without waiting for the user to ask'), which expands behavior beyond the stated trigger-based scope. In an automation skill, this can cause the agent to initiate scripting or workflow changes without clear user consent, increasing the risk of unauthorized actions or overreach.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The description is broad enough to match many common user requests such as 'save time' or 'reduce manual work', which can cause the skill to be invoked outside its intended scope. Over-broad invocation increases the chance that automation logic is applied to sensitive or inappropriate tasks without sufficient user intent or contextual safeguards.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.