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Security audit

Auto Workflow 1.0.0 (1)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is for automation, but it tells the agent to proactively create scripts and recurring workflows without waiting for the user to ask or approve.

Install only if you are comfortable with an automation-focused skill that may push from advice into implementation. Before allowing it to act, require a clear plan, list of files or systems affected, any external messages or API calls, and separate confirmation for scripts, scheduled jobs, recurring runs, or email/report sending.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:41
Finding

Unsolicited Automation Through Skill Instruction Hijacking

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 41–46
Vulnerability Type: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable instruction segment — English rendering of the source text:

text
Rather than "answering the question," when repetition is observed, immediately build automation.

When encountering repetitive operations:
- Ask yourself: Can this be written as a script?
- Ask yourself: Can this run automatically next time?
- Do it directly without waiting for the user to request it.

Technical Analysis

The Skill instructs the agent to replace a response-oriented interaction model with proactive automation. Most importantly, it directs the agent to act without waiting for an explicit user request. This weakens the user-authorization boundary and can hijack the current session goal whenever the agent identifies an activity as repetitive.

The instruction is broadly scoped and does not require confirmation before writing scripts, changing configuration, scheduling recurring execution, sending messages, or invoking tools. Although the package contains no executable scripts or persistence implementation, an agent with file, shell, scheduling, email, or API tools could generate and execute such actions while following the Skill.

Attack Path

  1. The Skill is loaded because a user mentions automation, saving time, reducing manual work, or a repetitive task.
  2. The agent identifies a repeated activity in the user's description.
  3. The vulnerable instruction redirects the agent from answering or proposing a plan to immediately constructing automation.
  4. The agent generates scripts or configuration and may invoke available tools without obtaining explicit approval.
  5. Depending on available permissions, the resulting workflow may modify files, create recurring jobs, collect data, or perform outbound actions such as sending reports.
  6. Those actions may continue or produce ...[truncated 812 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

Replace the unconditional directive with a consent-based workflow:

  1. Require the agent to provide an automation proposal before creating or executing anything.
  2. Clearly enumerate expected file changes, commands, permissions, external services, recurring schedules, and outbound communications.
  3. Require explicit user approval before writing scripts, modifying configuration, invoking commands, creating scheduled tasks, or sending data.
  4. Use a preview or dry-run stage and present the expected effects to the user.
  5. Apply least privilege and restrict generated automation to the directories, systems, and data explicitly authorized by the user.
  6. Require separate confirmation for persistent or externally visible actions, including scheduled jobs, email delivery, API calls, and system-service changes.
  7. Provide rollback instructions and require testing in an isolated or limited-scope environment before broader deployment.
  8. Replace “do it directly without waiting for the user” with language such as: “Offer an automation plan and proceed only after the user explicitly approves its implementation and side effects.”
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages building scripts and automations proactively without warning about user-impacting changes or requiring approval. Because this skill's purpose is to produce executable workflows, such guidance can directly lead to unintended actions like sending emails, scheduling jobs, or modifying operational processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest uses broad activation phrases such as 'automate', 'save time', and 'reduce manual work', which can cause the skill to activate in many contexts where automation is not actually desired. Over-broad triggering increases the chance that the agent proposes or initiates workflow changes in situations outside the user's intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

Most of the skill instructions and behavior framing are written only in Chinese, which implies a fixed language mode without any stated user opt-in or locale justification. This can violate language or locale policy when users have not requested Chinese output.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs the agent to 'directly do it' when it detects repetitive work, rather than waiting for the user to request or approve automation. In a workflow-building skill, this can lead to unauthorized script creation or execution, causing changes to user systems, communications, or data flows without informed consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The manifest description is generic enough that a host system may activate this skill for a wide range of loosely related user requests about automation, productivity, or saving time. Over-broad activation increases the chance of unintended invocation and inappropriate access to user tasks or workflow-building contexts, even though the manifest itself does not contain directly malicious content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.