Back to skill

Security audit

Qingbo Search

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill does what it advertises: it uses your Qingbo credentials to send article-search queries to Qingbo and return results.

Install this only if you intend to use Qingbo's external API. Put only your own Qingbo credentials in config.json, keep that file out of source control and shared archives, expect searches to be sent to Qingbo and consume account quota, and avoid sensitive queries on untrusted networks because the API call uses HTTP.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The README explicitly tells users to store `app_key` and `app_secret` in a local `config.json` file but does not warn against committing that file to source control or recommend safer secret-handling practices. This can lead to accidental credential leakage through repositories, backups, logs, or shared project archives, especially in a skill intended for installation by end users.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill requires third-party API credentials and sends user search queries to an external service, but the documentation does not clearly disclose that user inputs and configured secrets are involved in external processing. This creates a privacy and transparency risk: users or operators may unknowingly transmit sensitive search terms to a third party, and poor handling of app_key/app_secret increases the chance of credential exposure or misuse.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill sends user-derived search terms and filters directly to a third-party API, which can expose potentially sensitive user queries to an external service without any disclosure or consent flow. In this context the behavior is core to the skill's functionality, but it still creates a privacy and data-handling risk because users may not realize their input leaves the local environment.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
index.js:63