Security audit

Qzone

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a Markdown-only QQ Zone guidance skill; it has some scope wording drift but no hidden execution, data access, persistence, or credential handling.

Before installing, understand that this is broader than a backup/privacy helper: it also gives QQ Zone content and engagement advice. It does not appear to run code or access accounts, but users should still handle deletion and third-party export tools carefully as the skill itself warns.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (3)

Tp2

High

Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence: 85% confidence
Finding: Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium

Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: The manifest describes a narrow helper for legacy-data export/backup and privacy configuration, but the body expands into broad content-operations, engagement, and growth advice. This scope drift can cause agents or users to invoke the skill for purposes not disclosed in metadata, weakening trust boundaries and enabling unexpected behavior selection in larger agent systems.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

Confidence: 89% confidence
Finding: The role section claims expertise in content operation, social interaction strategy, and fan growth, which materially exceeds the manifest's stated backup/privacy/legacy-support purpose. In agentic environments, this mismatch may lead to overbroad delegation, user surprise, or routing of social-engineering-adjacent tasks to a skill that was presented as a maintenance/privacy assistant.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.