Security audit

sorftime

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only Sorftime CLI skill whose credentialed API use and account-changing commands are disclosed and fit its stated ecommerce analytics purpose.

Install only if you intend to use Sorftime's authenticated API service. Verify the npm package and publisher, protect the Account-SK like a password, check the active profile before commands, and require explicit confirmation for deletions, monitoring subscriptions, image uploads, and high-volume requests that may consume credits.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 91% confidence
Finding: The README instructs users to paste an account secret token directly into a shell command but provides no guidance on secure handling, storage, rotation, or least-privilege use. In CLI contexts, secrets entered on the command line can be exposed through shell history, process listings, logs, screenshots, or shared terminals, which makes credential leakage a realistic risk.

Vague Triggers

Medium

Confidence: 88% confidence
Finding: The trigger list is unusually broad and includes generic e-commerce phrases such as platform APIs, bulk retrieval, monitoring, and workflow scripting. This can cause the skill to activate in unrelated conversations, steering users or agents into using an external CLI unnecessarily and increasing the chance of unintended command execution paths or data exposure through the tool.

Vague Triggers

Medium

Confidence: 84% confidence
Finding: The statement that users or agents '**must** use this skill' is overly absolute and can override safer or more appropriate alternatives. In an agent setting, this kind of coercive routing language increases the risk of unnecessary tool use, reduced human choice, and execution of external package installation or authenticated API workflows when they are not actually required.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 91% confidence
Finding: The documentation exposes a destructive operation (`ChangeFavoriteKeyword` with `command: "del"`) and even shows examples for deleting keywords, but provides no warning, confirmation guidance, scope clarification, or recovery/undo information. In an agent-driven setting, this increases the chance that an LLM or automation will issue unintended deletion requests and silently destroy a user's keyword library state.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 88% confidence
Finding: The document states that all API calls default to the currently active profile's Account-SK, but it does not warn users that requests will be authenticated with stored credentials or that this may access paid, rate-limited, or sensitive account-scoped data. In an agent skill context, this is risky because an automated agent may invoke commands under the wrong profile without explicit user awareness, causing unintended data access, spend, or leakage tied to the active account.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.