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Security audit

Subscription Audit

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a simple subscription-audit skill, but it asks users to paste sensitive bank or card history while giving privacy assurances it cannot support.

Review this skill carefully before installing. Use it only with minimized data: remove account numbers, names, addresses, balances, transaction IDs, unrelated columns, and any transactions not needed for subscription detection. Assume pasted data is processed under your configured model provider's privacy and retention policy unless you have verified a local/offline setup.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:94
Finding

Misleading Privacy Assurance for Sensitive Financial Data

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:36-39, 94-96; equivalent assurance in README.md:39-41
Vulnerability Type: Misleading handling and retention claims for sensitive financial data
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Snippets

From SKILL.md:36-39:

markdown
### Option A: CSV export (preferred)

Bank or card transaction export covering at least 60–90 days. Most banks export from the account activity page under "Download" or "Export."

**Ask the user to paste CSV contents directly into chat.**

From SKILL.md:94-96:

markdown
### Privacy note (once per session, not repeated on follow-ups)

> 🔒 **Privacy note:** This skill does not store, log, or transmit your financial data to any third party. Your transaction data passes only through the AI provider you configured in OpenClaw (e.g., Anthropic, OpenAI) — solely for this analysis, with no retention between sessions. For fully offline processing, configure Ollama as your model provider in OpenClaw settings.

Equivalent statement from README.md:39-41:

markdown
## Privacy

Your financial data is never stored, logged, or transmitted to any third party by this skill. It passes only through the AI provider you configured in OpenClaw (e.g., Anthropic, OpenAI) — solely for this analysis, with no retention between sessions. For fully offline processing, configure Ollama as your model provider in OpenClaw settings.

Technical Analysis

The skill explicitly solicits 60–90 days of bank or payment-card transaction data and directs users to paste it into the chat. When a remotely hosted model provider is configured, that transaction history necessarily passes to an external provider for processing.

The statement that financial data is not “transmit[ted] ... to any third party” is therefore inconsistent with the subsequent disclosure that it passes through providers such as Anthropic or OpenAI. In addition, this documentation-only skill has no technical mechanism to enf ...[truncated 2031 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace the absolute privacy claim with an accurate disclosure that submitted data is sent to the configured model provider and is governed by that provider's privacy, logging, and retention policies.
  2. Do not promise “no retention” unless the complete deployment enforces that property and the claim can be verified.
  3. Before requesting a CSV, instruct users to remove account numbers, card numbers, names, addresses, balances, transaction IDs, and all columns unrelated to the analysis.
  4. Request only the minimum required fields: transaction date, normalized merchant description, and amount.
  5. Encourage users to replace merchant names with aliases when exact identities are unnecessary.
  6. Prefer local preprocessing that extracts likely recurring transactions before any model submission, reducing the amount of financial history disclosed.
  7. Present local-model processing as an optional privacy measure, while avoiding unconditional guarantees unless the local deployment and its logging configuration have been validated.
  8. Update both SKILL.md and README.md so their privacy language remains consistent.

A safer notice would be:

markdown
Your transaction data is processed by the model provider configured in OpenClaw and is subject to that provider's privacy and retention policies. Before submitting an export, remove account numbers, names, addresses, balances, transaction IDs, and unrelated columns. For local processing, you may configure a local model provider and review its logging settings.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill solicits highly sensitive financial transaction CSVs without a clear upfront warning that the pasted data may include account activity, merchant history, and other personal financial details. In this context, the absence of a conspicuous caution increases the chance of over-sharing sensitive data into an AI workflow before users understand the privacy implications.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The README makes an absolute privacy claim ('never stored, logged, or transmitted to any third party') while also admitting the data is sent to an external AI provider. For a skill handling bank/card transaction data, this is materially misleading and can cause users to disclose sensitive financial information under a false assumption about where their data goes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs users to paste raw bank or card CSV contents into chat, which may include sensitive financial history, merchant details, balances, and account identifiers, without an upfront warning before collection. In this context, the danger is elevated because the skill is designed for personal finance analysis and encourages broad disclosure of complete transaction exports.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The privacy note is misleading because it first says the skill does not store, log, or transmit financial data to any third party, then immediately states the data passes through the configured AI provider. For a skill handling bank and card transaction exports, inaccurate privacy assurances can cause users to share highly sensitive financial data under a false sense of safety.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.