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Security audit

Telegram Mini App Dev

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a focused Telegram Mini App helper; its main caution is manual deployment guidance that uses an unpinned npx command.

Installers should treat this as benign development guidance, but pin Wrangler and other deployment tools in project dependencies with a lockfile before using the deployment commands, and avoid enabling the debug overlay in production unless intended.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
references/KNOWLEDGE.md:349
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Execution During Deployment## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `references/KNOWLEDGE.md`, lines 349–352 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned package execution and software supply-chain exposure **Risk Level**: Medium **Complete Code Snippet**: ```bash # Always staging first npx wrangler pages deploy dist --project-name myapp-staging # Production only after testing npx wrangler pages deploy dist --project-name myapp ``` ### Technical Analysis The deployment instructions invoke `wrangler` through `npx` without specifying a reviewed version. If Wrangler is not already installed locally, `npx` may retrieve and execute a mutable package version from the configured package registry. The Skill does not require a pinned project dependency, committed lockfile, integrity verification, offline execution, or trusted registry configuration. Consequently, the code that executes on a developer workstation or CI runner may differ from the code reviewed when this Skill was audited. This behavior is not necessary to achieve the Skill's declared Telegram Mini App functionality. Deployment can instead use a version-pinned, lockfile-verified local dependency with narrowly scoped credentials. ### Attack Path 1. A developer or CI job follows the documented deployment command. 2. The environment does not contain a suitable local Wrangler installation. 3. `npx` resolves the unpinned `wrangler` package through the configured registry. 4. A compromised release, registry account, registry response, dependency, or malicious registry configuration supplies attacker-controlled code. 5. Package or CLI code executes with the permissions of the developer or CI process. 6. The malicious code can inspect accessible files, environment variables, deployment credentials, and the build workspace, and may alter the deployed artifact. Exploitation depends on compromise or manipulation of the package supply chain; the audited repository itself does not contain a malicious Wr ...[truncated 672 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Add Wrangler as an exact-version project development dependency rather than resolving it dynamically: ```bash npm install --save-dev --save-exact wrangler@<reviewed-version> ``` 2. Commit the generated lockfile and review dependency changes before upgrades. 3. In CI, install dependencies reproducibly with: ```bash npm ci ``` 4. Invoke only the installed local package and prevent network fallback where supported: ```bash npm exec --offline -- wrangler pages deploy dist --project-name myapp-staging npm exec --offline -- wrangler pages deploy dist --project-name myapp ``` 5. Configure trusted registries explicitly and enable package provenance, integrity, and dependency scanning controls. 6. Use a narrowly scoped Cloudflare deployment token that can access only the required project and environment. 7. Separate staging and production credentials, require explicit production approval, and avoid exposing unrelated secrets to the deployment process. 8. Pin and review all CI actions and build-tool versions involved in deployment.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Content
- **[references/components.tsx](references/components.tsx)** — Ready-to-use components (SafeAreaHeader, DebugOverlay)
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.