Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a coherent web-search skill that sends user queries to Alibaba Cloud DashScope as advertised, with no hidden local access, persistence, or destructive behavior found.
Install only if you are comfortable using Alibaba Cloud DashScope for searches. Do not submit secrets, private internal data, or regulated personal information as search queries, and consider using a temporary environment variable instead of permanently storing the API key in a shell profile.
The skill clearly requires environment access for DASHSCOPE_API_KEY and network access to a remote SSE endpoint, but it does not declare an explicit permission or allowed-tools scope. This weakens least-privilege controls and makes it harder for users or hosting platforms to understand and constrain what the skill can access.
The skill states that it performs real-time web search through Alibaba Cloud Bailian, but the user-facing description does not clearly warn that submitted queries are sent to a third-party service. Users may unknowingly transmit sensitive prompts, internal data, or regulated information to an external provider, creating privacy and compliance risk.
The embedded Python emits status and error messages in Chinese such as 'SSE监听', '错误: 无法建立MCP会话连接', and result labels, which imposes a specific language on users. This matches the language/locale policy violation category because the script does not provide opt-in, selection, or justification for the locale restriction.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
h2 = {'Authorization': f'Bearer {api_key}', 'Content-Type': 'application/json'}
# MCP握手
requests.post(msg_url, headers=h2, json={
'jsonrpc':'2.0','id':0,'method':'initialize',
'params':{'protocolVersion':'2024-11-05','capabilities':{},'clientInfo':{'name':'bailian-search','version':'1.1.0'}}
}, timeout=10)
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
h2 = {'Authorization': f'Bearer {api_key}', 'Content-Type': 'application/json'}
# MCP握手
requests.post(msg_url, headers=h2, json={
'jsonrpc':'2.0','id':0,'method':'initialize',
'params':{'protocolVersion':'2024-11-05','capabilities':{},'clientInfo':{'name':'bailian-search','version':'1.1.0'}}
}, timeout=10)
This request sends the user-supplied search query to an external third-party service. That is expected for a web-search skill, but it still creates a real privacy and data-handling risk because sensitive prompts, internal names, or secrets entered by a user could be transmitted off-platform without sanitization, minimization, or an explicit consent boundary in the script itself.
time.sleep(0.5)
# 搜索
requests.post(msg_url, headers=h2, json={
'jsonrpc':'2.0','id':100,'method':'tools/call',
'params':{'name':'bailian_web_search','arguments':{'query':query,'count':count}}
}, timeout=10)
The README instructs users to configure an API key and use the search tool but does not clearly disclose that user queries will be transmitted to an external Alibaba Cloud DashScope service. This creates a transparency and privacy risk because operators may unknowingly send sensitive prompts, internal terms, or regulated data to a third party.
No suspicious patterns detected.