T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
scripts/generate_image.py:2- Finding
Unpinned Runtime Dependencies Permit Unreviewed Package Updates
- Content
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=3.10" # dependencies = [ # "google-genai>=1.0.0", # "pillow>=10.0.0", # ] # /// ``` ### Technical Analysis The inline dependency metadata specifies only minimum versions for `google-genai` and `pillow`. It does not pin exact reviewed versions, reference a lockfile, or verify package hashes. When the documented `uv run` workflow resolves these dependencies, a newer package release satisfying the constraints may be installed and executed even though that release was not part of the audited project. Python package initialization and imported module code execute with the same operating-system identity and environment as the skill. This is not evidence that either current dependency is malicious. The issue is that the reviewed source does not deterministically identify the dependency code that will execute in future runs. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package maintainer account, distribution infrastructure, or another trusted release channel for one of the named dependencies. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version satisfying `>=1.0.0` or `>=10.0.0`. 3. A user invokes the script through the documented `uv run` command without a reviewed lockfile already constraining resolution. 4. The resolver selects and installs the compromised qualifying release. 5. Malicious package code executes when the script imports the dependency: ```python from google import genai from google.genai import types from PIL import Image as PILImage ``` 6. The dependency code runs with access to the script process's environment, filesystem permissions, network access, and Gemini credentials. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary Python code execution under the acc ...[truncated 519 chars]- Remediation
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