T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
README.md:26- Finding
Unverified Remote Executable Retrieval from a Mutable Branch
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
README.md, lines 26–32
Vulnerability Type: Unverified retrieval of executable code from a mutable remote source
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
bash mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills/synomega curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zbc0315/synomega-skill/main/SKILL.md \ -o ~/.claude/skills/synomega/SKILL.md curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zbc0315/synomega-skill/main/scripts/synomega_run.py \ -o ~/.claude/skills/synomega/synomega_run.pyTechnical Analysis
The manual installation procedure downloads Skill instructions and executable Python code directly from the mutable
mainbranch of a personal GitHub repository. It does not pin a reviewed commit or release and does not verify a cryptographic signature or checksum.Consequently, the code installed by a user can differ from the version that was audited. The downloaded
synomega_run.pyis intended to be invoked by the Agent, making the remote repository an effective post-review code-execution channel. The command also overwrites files at the destination without checking whether trusted versions already exist.No malicious behavior was found in the bundled version of
scripts/synomega_run.py. The risk arises from allowing its effective payload to change after review.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the upstream GitHub account, repository, maintainer credentials, or branch protection.
- The attacker modifies
SKILL.mdorscripts/synomega_run.pyon themainbranch. - A user follows the documented manual installation procedure.
curldownloads the modified content and overwrites the local Skill files without integrity validation.- The Agent loads the altered instructions or executes the altered Python helper.
- The payload runs with the permissions and accessible resources of the user or Agent process.
Impact Assessment
A malicious replacement scr ...[truncated 560 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin each download URL to a reviewed immutable commit hash or versioned release rather than
main. - Publish SHA-256 hashes or signed release manifests and verify them before installing either file.
- Prefer distribution through a signed, versioned Skill package instead of independent raw-file downloads.
- Configure branch protection, mandatory review, signed commits or tags, and strong maintainer authentication.
- Download into a temporary file, verify integrity, and only then atomically move it into the Skill directory.
- Detect existing destination files and require explicit confirmation before overwriting them.
- Document the exact reviewed version so users can reproduce the audited installation.
- Pin each download URL to a reviewed immutable commit hash or versioned release rather than
