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Security audit

Openclaw Skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This governance skill is coherent in purpose, but it requires review because it can force broad agent actions and raw input through an unbundled Python engine with weak dependency scoping.

Review before installing. This skill is not merely advisory: it is designed to mediate many agent actions and external inputs through cord_engine. Only use it if you trust the exact cord_engine installation path/package, are comfortable with commands and input summaries being evaluated and logged, and understand where intent locks and audit logs are stored.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:18
Finding

Mandatory Agent Behavior and Tool-Call Hijacking

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/cord_status.py:15
Finding

Arbitrary Python Module Execution Through Unvalidated Import Path

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes Python and references local code execution paths, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope or allowed-tools policy. That creates governance ambiguity: an agent may treat the skill as broadly applicable and expose environment-derived data or execute supporting code without clear least-privilege boundaries, increasing the chance of unintended access or misuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The script prints the intent-lock user ID and full intent text directly to stdout, which can expose sensitive operational context, identities, or task descriptions to anyone with terminal access, shell history capture, logging, or redirected output. In a governance/security tool, this is more dangerous than ordinary status output because the intent text may summarize high-value actions, targets, or internal workflows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The script prints recent audit-log proposal contents, which may contain sensitive prompts, file paths, network targets, secrets accidentally logged, or other operational details. Because audit logs in this skill are specifically tied to blocked or evaluated tool actions, exposing proposal text increases the chance of leaking security-relevant context through console output or collected logs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The skill mandates that every significant action be evaluated through CORD and includes identity-specific state such as user_id, passphrase, and intent locks, but it does not provide user opt-in or a consent boundary. In practice this can force agent workflows through an external policy layer that may process user/task data or establish persistent session controls without explicit authorization, which is a privacy and autonomy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.