T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:18- Finding
Mandatory Agent Behavior and Tool-Call Hijacking
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This governance skill is coherent in purpose, but it requires review because it can force broad agent actions and raw input through an unbundled Python engine with weak dependency scoping.
Review before installing. This skill is not merely advisory: it is designed to mediate many agent actions and external inputs through cord_engine. Only use it if you trust the exact cord_engine installation path/package, are comfortable with commands and input summaries being evaluated and logged, and understand where intent locks and audit logs are stored.
SKILL.md:18Mandatory Agent Behavior and Tool-Call Hijacking
scripts/cord_status.py:15Arbitrary Python Module Execution Through Unvalidated Import Path
The skill invokes Python and references local code execution paths, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope or allowed-tools policy. That creates governance ambiguity: an agent may treat the skill as broadly applicable and expose environment-derived data or execute supporting code without clear least-privilege boundaries, increasing the chance of unintended access or misuse.
The script prints the intent-lock user ID and full intent text directly to stdout, which can expose sensitive operational context, identities, or task descriptions to anyone with terminal access, shell history capture, logging, or redirected output. In a governance/security tool, this is more dangerous than ordinary status output because the intent text may summarize high-value actions, targets, or internal workflows.
The script prints recent audit-log proposal contents, which may contain sensitive prompts, file paths, network targets, secrets accidentally logged, or other operational details. Because audit logs in this skill are specifically tied to blocked or evaluated tool actions, exposing proposal text increases the chance of leaking security-relevant context through console output or collected logs.
The skill mandates that every significant action be evaluated through CORD and includes identity-specific state such as user_id, passphrase, and intent locks, but it does not provide user opt-in or a consent boundary. In practice this can force agent workflows through an external policy layer that may process user/task data or establish persistent session controls without explicit authorization, which is a privacy and autonomy concern.
No suspicious patterns detected.