T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
requirements.txt:1- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Can Access Bring Account Credentials
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
requirements.txt:1-2
Related Locations:bring.py:8-18,SKILL.md:37-45,README.md:52-69
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through unpinned dependencies
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
requirements.txt:1-2:text bring-api python-dotenvbring.py:8-18:python import aiohttp from bring_api import Bring from dotenv import load_dotenv load_dotenv() EMAIL = os.environ["BRING_EMAIL"] PASSWORD = os.environ["BRING_PASSWORD"] async def get_bring(): session = aiohttp.ClientSession() bring = Bring(session, EMAIL, PASSWORD) await bring.login() return bring, sessionSKILL.md:37-38:bash uv run --with bring-api --with python-dotenv python bring.py list --json uv run --with bring-api --with python-dotenv python bring.py add "Milk" "Eggs" "Butter:Irish"SKILL.md:45:bash pip install -r requirements.txtTechnical Analysis
Both documented installation methods resolve mutable package versions without version constraints, integrity hashes, or a committed lock file. The project documentation also identifies
bring-apias an unofficial API client.Imported Python dependencies execute inside the skill process. They can inspect its environment, and the
bring-apiclient is explicitly passedBRING_EMAILandBRING_PASSWORD. Consequently, a compromised package release, package-account takeover, malicious transitive dependency, or unsafe dependency resolution could introduce arbitrary code with direct access to the credentials and all local resources available to the skill process.This finding does not establish that the current dependencies are malicious. The vulnerability is the absence of controls that ensure future installations retrieve the same reviewed artifacts.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the publishing account, release process, or ...[truncated 1466 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin every direct dependency to an explicitly reviewed version rather than accepting any available release.
- Generate and commit a lock file that records all transitive dependencies.
- Require cryptographic hashes for downloaded artifacts where the package-management workflow supports them.
- Configure installation to use a trusted package index and disable unexpected fallback indexes to reduce dependency-confusion risk.
- Audit direct and transitive dependencies with established software-composition-analysis tooling before releases and periodically afterward.
- Prefer an official, maintained Bring client if one becomes available; otherwise, review changes to the unofficial client before updating it.
- Execute the skill in a constrained environment containing only the credentials and filesystem access it requires.
- Avoid reusing the Bring password for any other service and rotate it immediately if dependency compromise is suspected.
- Ensure both the
uvandpipinstructions consume the same locked, integrity-verified dependency set.
