T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
references/sellersprite-api.md:10- Finding
Reusable SellerSprite Session Credentials Are Exposed to the Agent Context
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This Amazon research skill is mostly coherent, but it asks the agent to copy and reuse logged-in SellerSprite session cookies, creating a real credential exposure risk.
Review carefully before installing. Use only if you are comfortable with browser-based research across these marketplaces, and avoid allowing the agent to copy SellerSprite cookies or tokens into prompts, logs, files, or reports. Prefer an official API key or keeping authenticated actions inside the browser session, and treat the generated HTML report as active content built from untrusted marketplace data.
references/sellersprite-api.md:10Reusable SellerSprite Session Credentials Are Exposed to the Agent Context
references/html-template.md:3Untrusted Marketplace Data May Be Injected into the Generated HTML Report
The skill asks for handling authenticated account cookies/tokens but provides no warning that these are sensitive credentials or that they should not be retained, shared, or output. In context, this omission is dangerous because the skill targets a manual login flow and then normalizes secret extraction as part of routine operation.
The instruction to extract and reuse authenticated session cookies from a manual login flow is a direct unsafe-secret-handling pattern. It can enable account misuse, session theft, policy violations, and unintended access to the user's paid SellerSprite account beyond the immediate research task.
The skill instructs an agent to extract authentication cookies and session tokens from a logged-in browser and replay them in API calls without any safeguards, consent flow, or handling restrictions. This creates a credential-handling vulnerability because those tokens can grant full access to the user's authenticated account and may be exposed in logs, prompts, reports, or downstream tools.
The document explicitly directs reuse of authenticated session artifacts (ecookie, rank-login-user, Sprite-X-Token) from an interactive login session to access protected endpoints. In this skill context, that is especially dangerous because the agent is designed for multi-platform automated collection and concurrent processing, increasing the chance of session theft, unauthorized account actions, and accidental propagation of tokens across tools or tasks.
The trigger list includes generic phrases such as '市场调研', '快速调研', '产品分析', and '竞品分析', which are broad enough to match many ordinary research or analysis requests outside this skill’s intended Amazon product-selection workflow. The file does not provide limiting context, explicit activation constraints, or negative examples to narrow when these triggers should or should not invoke the skill.
The skill explicitly instructs the operator to extract authenticated SellerSprite session cookies and tokens from a logged-in browser and reuse them for API access. That is broader than ordinary product research and creates a credential-handling and session-hijacking risk, especially if those secrets are logged, persisted, or reused outside the original browser context.
The skill explicitly instructs extracting an Amazon page image URL and sending it to a third-party 1688 endpoint, but provides no user disclosure, consent step, or data-handling constraint. Even if the transmitted value is only an image URL, it is page-derived data sent cross-platform and may expose browsing targets, identifiers in signed image URLs, or commercially sensitive research activity.
The fallback section says to use Chinese keywords for search, which imposes a specific language/locale behavior. Because the file does not offer opt-in, alternatives, or a clear region-specific justification, this is a natural-language policy violation under the language/locale rule.
The file’s headings and instructions are entirely in Chinese, including operational guidance such as filtering categories and logic descriptions. There is no indication that the skill is region-specific or that users can opt into this locale, which creates a natural-language locale policy concern under the stated rules.
The entire skill description and operational instructions are written exclusively in Chinese, with no indication that users may choose another language or locale. Per the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy violation unless the locale restriction is clearly documented and justified.
This file contains user-facing operational instructions only in Chinese, which can impose a fixed language on users without opt-in. The policy allows locale constraints only when they are explicitly offered as a choice or clearly justified as region-specific, which is not stated here.
The entire skill is written in Chinese and provides mandatory workflow instructions without offering any language or locale choice. This can violate a language/locale policy when users or downstream systems are not explicitly opting into Chinese-only operation.
The document is written entirely in Chinese and defines report labels and structure in Chinese, which indicates a fixed language/locale for generated output. There is no indication that users can opt into another language or that the template is restricted to a China-specific compliance or regional workflow.
This file contains user-facing natural-language instructions exclusively in Chinese, which can impose a language constraint on users without opt-in. Under the policy, forced language or locale without choice or justification is a natural-language policy concern.