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Security audit

Model Switch Skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a small, disclosed model-provider switcher whose external API endpoints and configuration use match its stated purpose.

Before installing, confirm you trust the provider endpoints you configure and understand that prompts may be sent to the selected LLM provider. Use your own API keys, watch for provider billing/data policies, and note that the usage examples are written mainly for Chinese-language invocation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The activation and query examples are all written as Chinese phrases, which implies the skill is intended to be invoked in a specific language. The file does not offer alternative language options or explain that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-language environment, creating a natural-language policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 48)May include surrounding context.

md
"models": {
    "providers": {
      "minimax-portal": {
        "baseUrl": "https://api.minimaxi.com/anthropic",
        "apiKey": "your-key"
      },
      "local": {

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 52)May include surrounding context.

md
"apiKey": "your-key"
      },
      "local": {
        "baseUrl": "https://api.scnet.cn/api/llm/v1",
        "apiKey": "your-key"
      }
    }

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The manifest description is written only in Chinese ("切换不同LLM API提供商"), which can impose a language-specific experience without offering users a language choice or documenting a justified locale restriction. The policy specifically calls for flagging language or locale constraints when they are not optional or clearly justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.