SONiC KVM Testbed

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: May 28, 2026 · 6:48 AM UTC
• Version: 1.2.0

Overview

This skill appears intended for a real local SONiC virtual testbed, but it gives unsafe privilege and credential instructions that need careful review before use.

Install only for an isolated, disposable lab. Do not reuse the documented passwords, do not expose the DUT or management bridge to untrusted networks, avoid chmod 666 on the Docker socket, prefer SSH keys or unique secrets, and remove any temporary admin accounts and sudoers/socket changes after testing.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Tool Misuse: Tool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (13)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs users to create a plaintext vault password file with a trivial default value (`abc`) and later uses a hardcoded SSH credential (`password`) for access. Even in a local lab, documenting weak default credentials without an explicit warning normalizes insecure handling of secrets and can lead to credential reuse, accidental disclosure in shell history, filesystems, or screenshots.

Missing User Warnings

High

• Confidence: 100% confidence
• Finding: This section directs the user to create an `admin` account with passwordless sudo and then make the Docker socket world-writable. That combination effectively grants root-equivalent access to any local user or process on the DUT, greatly increasing the risk of full system compromise if the VM is reachable or shared.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: The document instructs operators to create additional privileged accounts, grant passwordless sudo, and relax access to the Docker socket without any warning about the security consequences. In a testbed context this may be intended for convenience, but it materially weakens host and device security by expanding privileged access and making compromise or lateral movement easier.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 99% confidence
• Finding: The configuration examples embed default and plaintext passwords such as 'password', 'YourPaSsWoRd', and EOS defaults, with no requirement to rotate them. In lab environments these values are often copied verbatim, which can lead to trivial unauthorized access if the systems are reachable or reused beyond an isolated environment.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: Recommending `sudo chmod 666 /var/run/docker.sock` makes the Docker control socket world-writable, allowing any local user or process on the DUT to control Docker. Since Docker access is effectively root-equivalent on many systems, this can lead to privilege escalation and full host compromise.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

# For CI image (has admin, needs your local user):
ssh admin@<DUT_IP>
sudo useradd -m -s /bin/bash -G sudo,docker <your_user>
echo '<your_user>:password' | sudo chpasswd
sudo bash -c "echo '<your_user> ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL' > /etc/sudoers.d/<your_user>"

# For local build (has your user, needs admin):

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: This command creates a new user with membership in privileged groups including sudo and docker. In this skill's context it is operational setup rather than overtly malicious, but it still grants broad control over the device and can effectively provide root-equivalent access via sudo or Docker.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

ssh admin@<DUT_IP>
sudo useradd -m -s /bin/bash -G sudo,docker <your_user>
echo '<your_user>:password' | sudo chpasswd
sudo bash -c "echo '<your_user> ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL' > /etc/sudoers.d/<your_user>"

# For local build (has your user, needs admin):
ssh <your_user>@<DUT_IP>

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: Piping a plaintext password into sudo chpasswd sets a predictable credential and exposes sensitive handling patterns in documentation and shell history workflows. In combination with the privileged account creation around it, this creates an easily abused admin path if copied unchanged.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

# For local build (has your user, needs admin):
ssh <your_user>@<DUT_IP>
sudo useradd -m -s /bin/bash -G sudo,docker admin
echo 'admin:password' | sudo chpasswd
sudo bash -c "echo 'admin ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL' > /etc/sudoers.d/admin"

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: This command creates an 'admin' account with sudo and docker group access, expanding the number of privileged identities on the DUT. Even in a virtual lab, adding another admin-capable account increases attack surface and persistence options if the DUT is compromised.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

# For local build (has your user, needs admin):
ssh <your_user>@<DUT_IP>
sudo useradd -m -s /bin/bash -G sudo,docker admin
echo 'admin:password' | sudo chpasswd
sudo bash -c "echo 'admin ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL' > /etc/sudoers.d/admin"

# Always fix docker socket:

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: Setting the admin password via a plaintext shell pipeline encourages use of a weak default secret and insecure credential handling. If reused in automation or copied directly, attackers can trivially authenticate as an administrative user.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

ssh <your_user>@<DUT_IP>
sudo useradd -m -s /bin/bash -G sudo,docker admin
echo 'admin:password' | sudo chpasswd
sudo bash -c "echo 'admin ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL' > /etc/sudoers.d/admin"

# Always fix docker socket:
sudo chmod 666 /var/run/docker.sock

• Confidence: 99% confidence
• Finding: Writing 'admin ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL' to sudoers gives the account unrestricted passwordless root access. This removes an important control boundary and makes any compromise of that account immediately equivalent to full system compromise.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

sudo bash -c "echo 'admin ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL' > /etc/sudoers.d/admin"

# Always fix docker socket:
sudo chmod 666 /var/run/docker.sock
```

### Identifying the Build User

• Confidence: 100% confidence
• Finding: Changing /var/run/docker.sock to mode 666 makes the Docker daemon world-accessible, effectively granting root-equivalent control to any local user or process able to reach the socket. In a shared host or compromised test runner, this can be used to start privileged containers, mount the host filesystem, and fully take over the system.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

# For CI image (has admin, needs your local user):
ssh admin@<DUT_IP>
sudo useradd -m -s /bin/bash -G sudo,docker <your_user>
echo '<your_user>:password' | sudo chpasswd
sudo bash -c "echo '<your_user> ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL' > /etc/sudoers.d/<your_user>"

# For local build (has your user, needs admin):

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: Piping a username:password pair into sudo chpasswd combines sensitive data exposure with privileged execution. Although commonly used in admin scripts, documenting it with a static password in a reusable skill increases the chance of insecure copy-paste provisioning and credential compromise.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

# For local build (has your user, needs admin):
ssh <your_user>@<DUT_IP>
sudo useradd -m -s /bin/bash -G sudo,docker admin
echo 'admin:password' | sudo chpasswd
sudo bash -c "echo 'admin ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL' > /etc/sudoers.d/admin"

# Always fix docker socket:

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: This repeats the same insecure pattern for the admin account: a plaintext credential piped into a privileged password-changing command. Because the target account is administrative, exploitation would lead directly to privileged access on the DUT.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.