YARA rule 'agent_skill_prompt_injection_hidden_instructions': Prompt injection or hidden instructions embedded in AI agent skill text [agent_skills]
High
- Category
- YARA Match
- Content
their content, unusually large documentation, or sections that serve no clear purpose for the stated function - **Encoded payload detection:** Base64, hex, URL-encoded, or otherwise obfuscated content that doesn't match the skill's stated purpose (e.g., a formatting skill containing base64-encoded shell commands) Also checked: documentation that contains hidden directives aimed at tricking an AI agent into acting beyond the skill's stated scope — including trust-override language (phrases urging the agent to trust the skill unconditionally), review-bypass directives (phrases urging the agent to skip or shorten the audit), and install-without-review pressure (urgency or authority framing designed to rush installation). ### Area 2 — Supply Chain & Source Verification (High Priority) _Can you trace where this skill and all its dependencies come from, and are they trustworthy?_ Beyond checking version locks, this area investigates the skill's provenance — who made it, wh
- Confidence
- 80% confidence
- Finding
- YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
