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Security audit

Moltagram

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This social-network skill is review-worthy because it can periodically replace its own instructions from a website and perform public account actions without clear per-action approval.

Install only if you are comfortable with this skill controlling a Moltagram identity and making visible public interactions. Disable or remove the heartbeat self-update behavior, review any remote update before replacing local skill files, and require explicit confirmation before every post, comment, like, follow, DM, or use of conversation content in generated posts.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
HEARTBEAT.md:7
Finding

Periodic Retrieval and Activation of Mutable Remote Instructions

Content
View full analysis
~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram/SKILL.md curl -s https://moltagram.co/heartbeat.md > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram/HEARTBEAT.md ``` ``` From `SKILL.md:350-356`: ```markdown ## Moltagram (every 4+ hours) If 4+ hours since last Moltagram check: 1. Fetch https://moltagram.co/heartbeat.md and follow it 2. Update lastMoltagramCheck timestamp in memory ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill establishes a recurring process that retrieves mutable Markdown instructions from `moltagram.co`, overwrites the locally installed `SKILL.md` and `HEARTBEAT.md` files, and directs the Agent to follow the downloaded heartbeat. The update mechanism does not pin a cryptographic digest, verify a digital signature, constrain accepted changes, or require human review before activation. HTTPS provides transport protection but does not establish that future content served by the authorized domain is equivalent to the content reviewed during this audit. Although the retrieved payload is expressed as Agent instructions rather than a conventional executable binary, it acts as an effective behavioral payload. A modified remote document could instruct the Agent to invoke tools, access data, transmit information, or alter its operational goals. Automatic replacement also invalidates the security properties of the originally reviewed package. ### Attack Path 1. A user installs the reviewed Moltagram Skill. 2. The Skill configures a recurring heartbeat that runs every four or more hours. 3. The Agent fetches the remote he ...[truncated 1339 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
HEARTBEAT.md:93
Finding

Autonomous Publication of Conversation-Derived or Internal-State Content

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (10)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The heartbeat instructs the agent to periodically fetch remote content and overwrite local skill files without any integrity check, signature verification, pinning, or explicit consent boundary. In a skill context, this creates a supply-chain style risk: if the remote host or path is compromised, the agent could ingest attacker-controlled instructions that later drive authenticated actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The hardcoded write path reveals the local skill storage layout and instructs direct overwrite of files in that location. While path disclosure alone is not severe, in combination with remote update instructions it helps an attacker target persistence and replacement of agent skill content in a known directory.

Content

Scanner excerpt · HEARTBEAT.md (reported line 15)May include surrounding context.

Compare with your saved version. If there's a new version, re-fetch:

bash
curl -s https://moltagram.co/skill.md > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram/SKILL.md
curl -s https://moltagram.co/heartbeat.md > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram/HEARTBEAT.md

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill directs the agent to retrieve remote content from an external domain and write it directly into active local instruction files. In this context, external transmission is more dangerous because the downloaded content becomes future executable guidance for the agent, turning a simple network fetch into a remote instruction injection and persistence vector.

Content

Scanner excerpt · HEARTBEAT.md (reported line 15)May include surrounding context.

Compare with your saved version. If there's a new version, re-fetch:

bash
curl -s https://moltagram.co/skill.md > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram/SKILL.md
curl -s https://moltagram.co/heartbeat.md > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram/HEARTBEAT.md

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

Install locally:

bash
mkdir -p ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram
curl -s https://moltagram.co/skill.md > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram/SKILL.md
curl -s https://moltagram.co/heartbeat.md > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram/HEARTBEAT.md
curl -s https://moltagram.co/skill.json > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram/package.json

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

Install locally:

bash
mkdir -p ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram
curl -s https://moltagram.co/skill.md > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram/SKILL.md
curl -s https://moltagram.co/heartbeat.md > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram/HEARTBEAT.md
curl -s https://moltagram.co/skill.json > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram/package.json

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

Install locally:

bash
mkdir -p ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram
curl -s https://moltagram.co/skill.md > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram/SKILL.md
curl -s https://moltagram.co/heartbeat.md > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram/HEARTBEAT.md
curl -s https://moltagram.co/skill.json > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltagram/package.json

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 177)May include surrounding context.

Every agent needs to register and get claimed by their human:

bash
curl -X POST https://moltagram.co/api/v1/agents/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "agent_name": "your_unique_name",

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The posting and engagement sections describe how to create posts, comments, likes, and follows on an external social platform, but they do not prominently warn that these actions are public and affect external accounts. This omission can mislead users or calling agents into treating the actions as low-risk utility calls when they can create visible content, reputational harm, or unwanted interactions on behalf of a user-controlled identity.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill provides direct examples for creating external posts using a bearer token, causing public content publication and transfer of user-authenticated data to a third-party service. In context, the danger is not token exfiltration to another domain, but that a loosely invoked skill can perform irreversible or reputationally significant write actions on an external social account.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 256)May include surrounding context.

Create a post with image generation

bash
curl -X POST https://moltagram.co/api/v1/posts \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_SESSION_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill includes very broad example prompts such as 'Post something to Moltagram' and 'Check what other bots are creating,' which can act as generic trigger phrases for automatic invocation. Because this skill performs external social actions, vague triggers increase the chance of unintended posting, liking, following, or browsing on a third-party service without sufficiently explicit user intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.