clipboard-manager-tool

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 11, 2026 · 2:18 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This clipboard-history skill is purpose-aligned and user-invoked, but users should know it can store sensitive clipboard contents in a plaintext workspace file.

Install only if you are comfortable with saved clipboard entries being written to `clipboard-history.md` in the workspace. Avoid saving passwords, API keys, MFA codes, private messages, or proprietary text, and clear the history when it is no longer needed.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: scripts/clipboard.sh:67
• Finding: Clipboard contents are persistently stored in an unprotected plaintext file## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/clipboard.sh`, lines 67-83 **Vulnerability Type**: Plaintext storage of potentially sensitive clipboard data **Risk Level**: Medium ### Technical Analysis The `save_clipboard` function reads arbitrary content from the system clipboard and appends it verbatim to `clipboard-history.md`: ```bash save_clipboard() { init_history local content=$(get_clipboard) local timestamp=$(date "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S") local count=$(grep -c "^## \[" "$HISTORY_FILE" 2>/dev/null || echo "0") local index=$((count + 1)) # Truncate content for display local preview=$(echo "$content" | head -c 50 | tr '\n' ' ') { echo "" echo "## [$index] $timestamp" echo "\`\`\`" echo "$content" echo "\`\`\`" echo "" } >> "$HISTORY_FILE" # Trim old entries if over limit trim_history ``` The history initialization at lines 10-15 also creates the file without explicitly setting restrictive permissions: ```bash init_history() { if [ ! -f "$HISTORY_FILE" ]; then echo "# Clipboard History" > "$HISTORY_FILE" echo "" >> "$HISTORY_FILE" fi } ``` Clipboard data commonly contains passwords, access tokens, private keys, personal messages, and other sensitive material. The script stores this data without encryption, redaction, expiration controls, or an explicit `0600` permission policy. Actual permissions depend on the invoking process's `umask`, and the workspace file may also be collected by backups, synchronization tools, indexing systems, or other agent operations. ### Attack Path 1. A user copies a password, API token, private message, or other secret to the system clipboard. 2. The user or agent invokes `clipboard.sh save`. 3. `get_clipboard` retrieves the secret and `save_clipboard` appends it verbatim to `clipboard-history.md`. 4. The ...[truncated 700 chars]
• Remediation: ## Remediation Suggestions - Create the history file with mode `0600`, using a restrictive `umask` before creation: ```bash umask 077 if [ ! -e "$HISTORY_FILE" ]; then printf '# Clipboard History\n\n' > "$HISTORY_FILE" fi chmod 600 -- "$HISTORY_FILE" ``` - Verify that an existing history path is a regular file owned by the current user and is not a symbolic link before reading or writing it. - Warn users that clipboard history is persistent and may contain secrets. - Provide an option to disable persistent history or store it only for a configured retention period. - Consider authenticated encryption using a user-controlled key for history stored on disk. - Add optional secret detection and redaction for common API tokens, passwords, private keys, and authentication headers. - Ensure clearing the history follows the project's data-deletion requirements; simple truncation may not constitute secure deletion on modern filesystems.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note

• Location: scripts/clipboard.sh:108
• Finding: Unvalidated command arguments can be interpreted as utility options or unsafe numeric values## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/clipboard.sh`, lines 108-121 **Vulnerability Type**: Argument and option injection **Risk Level**: Low ### Technical Analysis The history limit and search keyword are accepted without validation or an option terminator: ```bash show_history() { local limit="${1:-10}" init_history echo "📋 Clipboard History (last $limit):" echo "" grep "^## \[" "$HISTORY_FILE" | tail -n "$limit" } # Search history search_history() { local keyword="$1" init_history echo "🔍 Searching clipboard history for: $keyword" echo "" grep -A 2 -B 1 -i "$keyword" "$HISTORY_FILE" | head -50 } ``` Shell quoting prevents ordinary shell metacharacter injection, so this is not direct arbitrary shell-command execution. Nevertheless, a search keyword beginning with `-` can be interpreted by `grep` as an option rather than as the intended pattern. The history limit is passed as the argument to `tail -n` without checking that it is a bounded positive integer, allowing unsupported or unexpectedly large and negative values to alter behavior or cause errors. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker or untrusted caller supplies a search term beginning with a hyphen, or supplies a malformed, negative, or excessively large history limit. 2. The agent invokes the documented `search` or `history` operation with that value. 3. `grep` may parse the search value as an option, while `tail` may apply unintended numeric semantics or reject the value. 4. The operation returns misleading output, exposes more history metadata than intended by the requested limit, consumes unnecessary resources, or fails. ### Impact Assessment No arbitrary command execution or privilege escalation is demonstrated because the values are quoted and are not evaluated by a shell. The practical impact is limited to manipulation or disruption of clipboard-history search and display behavior, ...[truncated 228 chars]
• Remediation: ## Remediation Suggestions - Require `limit` to be a bounded positive integer: ```bash case "$limit" in ''|*[!0-9]*) printf 'Invalid history limit\n' >&2; return 2 ;; esac if [ "$limit" -lt 1 ] || [ "$limit" -gt "$MAX_HISTORY" ]; then printf 'History limit must be between 1 and %s\n' "$MAX_HISTORY" >&2 return 2 fi ``` - Terminate `grep` option processing before the user-controlled pattern: ```bash grep -A 2 -B 1 -i -- "$keyword" "$HISTORY_FILE" | head -50 ``` - Reject empty search terms if returning broad portions of history is not intended. - Return nonzero exit codes and clear error messages for invalid input. - Add tests covering keywords such as `--help`, `-f`, empty strings, and limits that are negative, nonnumeric, zero, or excessively large.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Memory Poisoning: Persistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (10)

Missing User Warnings

High

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The skill states that it manages clipboard history and stores data in a workspace file, but it does not warn that clipboard contents will be persisted to disk. Clipboard data frequently contains secrets or sensitive personal information, so silent persistence materially increases the risk of credential leakage, accidental disclosure, and long-term retention of confidential data.

Memory Manipulation

High

• Category: Memory Poisoning

Content

bash skills/clipboard-manager-1.0.0/scripts/clipboard.sh restore <index>
```

### Clear History
When user says: "clear clipboard history"
```bash
bash skills/clipboard-manager-1.0.0/scripts/clipboard.sh clear

• Confidence: 80% confidence
• Finding: Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Memory Manipulation

High

• Category: Memory Poisoning

Content

grep -A 2 -B 1 -i "$keyword" "$HISTORY_FILE" | head -50
}

# Clear history
clear_history() {
    echo "# Clipboard History" > "$HISTORY_FILE"
    echo "" >> "$HISTORY_FILE"

• Confidence: 80% confidence
• Finding: Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Memory Manipulation

High

• Category: Memory Poisoning

Content

grep -A 2 -B 1 -i "$keyword" "$HISTORY_FILE" | head -50
}

# Clear history
clear_history() {
    echo "# Clipboard History" > "$HISTORY_FILE"
    echo "" >> "$HISTORY_FILE"

• Confidence: 80% confidence
• Finding: Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: This markdown file documents a `clear` operation for clipboard history, which can affect user data, but it provides no warning that the action may remove stored clipboard items or be irreversible. Under the markdown-specific warning criteria, user-facing documentation should disclose behaviors that can affect user data or system integrity.

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The trigger description is broad enough that the skill may activate on loosely related phrases and handle clipboard content when the user did not explicitly intend persistent clipboard management. In a clipboard skill, unintended invocation can expose, overwrite, or persist sensitive copied data such as passwords, tokens, or private notes.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 91% confidence
• Finding: The documented clear-history command is destructive and presented without a warning, preview, or confirmation step. This can lead to accidental irreversible deletion of stored clipboard history, causing loss of user data and making audit or recovery of saved content impossible.

Ssd 3

Medium

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: This code persistently logs clipboard contents in plaintext to a history file, creating durable storage of transient and potentially sensitive user data. In the context of a clipboard-management skill, this is especially risky because users commonly copy credentials, MFA codes, private messages, and internal documents, all of which become retrievable long after the original clipboard use.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The script saves raw clipboard contents directly to a persistent markdown file on disk without user warning, consent, or any sensitivity filtering. Clipboard data frequently contains secrets such as passwords, tokens, API keys, personal data, or proprietary text, so this creates unintended at-rest retention and increases disclosure risk if the file is accessed later, synced, backed up, or exposed through other tooling.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The get operation prints the full clipboard contents to stdout, which can leak sensitive data into terminal scrollback, logs, recordings, CI traces, or shared shell sessions. Because clipboard contents often include secrets or private user data, exposing them verbatim materially increases the chance of accidental disclosure.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.