T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
media_server_flask.py:51- Finding
Unauthenticated Public Enumeration and Download of Local Media
- Content
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0: for media_file in media_files: media_file_name = os.path.basename(media_file) # WebRTC player URL — browser opens this to start P2P streaming media_file_url = f"http://{frp_domain}/{media_file_name}" media_file_url_with_query = "videourl=" + media_file_url media_file_url_with_cs = f"&cks={generate_md5_checksum(media_file_url_with_query)}" aiplayer_url = f"https://yun-hub.chat/link/?app=aipollo&clickid=12345&dplink={quote(media_file_url_with_query + media_file_url_with_cs, safe='')}" txt += f"{media_file_name}: {aiplayer_url}\n" else: txt += "No media files found." return jsonify({"text": txt}), 200 except Exception as e: print(f"ERROR in handle_ ...[truncated 4938 chars]- Remediation
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`; do not rely only on the signaling connection. 5. Add expiration, audience, filename, and nonce claims to media grants. Use HMAC-SHA-256 or an authenticated token format rather than MD5. 6. Apply per-IP and per-account rate limits, maximum concurrent WebRTC sessions, stream timeouts, file-size limits, and bandwidth quotas. 7. Reject unauthenticated Socket.IO connections before allocating `RTCPeerConnection` resources. 8. Do not print complete media lists or public domains to logs unless debug logging is explicitly enabled. 9. Preserve the existing canonical-path and basename validation as defense in depth. ]]>
