Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill does what it claims, but its setup flow has the agent create an external account and persist an API key for future sessions, which deserves user review.
Install only if you are comfortable using YTAPI as a third-party service. Prefer creating the YTAPI account yourself and pasting an API key, and store the key in a proper secrets manager or session-scoped environment variable instead of letting the agent persist it broadly for all future shells.
The instructions tell the agent to solicit sensitive information including an API key, email address, and a 6-digit verification code, then use those values to create and bind a third-party account. Handling both authentication factors and long-lived credentials materially increases the chance of secret leakage, account misuse, or unauthorized persistence.
The skill saves signup tokens and API-key-bearing responses into temporary files, then later extracts and persists the resulting API key. Temporary files in shared or weakly isolated environments can be read by other processes, retained in logs or snapshots, or mishandled before cleanup occurs.
The skill explicitly directs persistent storage of the user's API key so it is automatically available in future sessions and non-interactive shells. Long-lived ambient credentials are dangerous because they may be unintentionally reused by unrelated tasks, exposed to downstream tools, or harvested after host compromise.
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
2. Check it in the current session without printing it, for example
`test -n "$YTAPI_API_KEY" && echo set`. If the session must be reloaded to
see it, reload it or tell the user.
3. Delete the temporary files: `rm -f /tmp/ytapi-signup.json /tmp/ytapi-verify.json`.
The user can sign in at https://ytapi.dev/auth/login?utm_source=skill with the same email to
see usage, manage keys and buy credits.
The skill explicitly permits creating a third-party YTAPI account using the user's email, but it does not present a clear privacy/data-sharing warning at the point of collection or explain what data will be sent to the external service. This creates a real privacy and consent risk because the agent may transmit personal data to an external provider without sufficiently informed user approval.
The skill sends user-supplied video identifiers or URLs and an API credential to an external service at api.ytapi.dev. While external API use is expected for this skill, it still represents a real data-transmission boundary and can expose user inputs, usage metadata, and potentially sensitive URLs to a third party if invoked without clear disclosure.
curl -s "https://api.ytapi.dev/v1/transcripts?video_id=VIDEO_ID_OR_URL&format=text" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $YTAPI_API_KEY"
The file instructs the agent to make YTAPI_API_KEY persist across future sessions and non-interactive shells without presenting any user-facing warning about the security implications. Persisting secrets silently can expose them to other processes, future tasks, or users sharing the same environment.
The skill directs the agent to help create a third-party YTAPI account and then persist the resulting credential for later reuse. That exceeds the narrow transcript-retrieval function and expands the agent's authority into account provisioning and long-term secret management, increasing the blast radius if the environment is shared or later compromised.
The skill asks the user for an email address and transmits it to an external service to create an account, but it does not clearly warn the user that their personal data will be sent off-platform. This creates privacy and consent risk, especially because account creation is optional and beyond the core transcript function.
This command sends the user's email address to an external service endpoint for signup. External transmission of personal data is risky when not minimized, clearly disclosed, and consented to, particularly since this action supports account creation rather than the core retrieval function.
to request in one step.
curl -s -X POST https://ytapi.dev/api/agent/signup \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email": "USER_EMAIL"}' \
-o /tmp/ytapi-signup.json
This command transmits a signup token and user-provided verification code to the external service, completing an authentication flow on the user's behalf. Sending active authentication material off-platform is sensitive because compromise of the agent environment or logs could enable account takeover or unauthorized account binding.
TOKEN=$(sed -n 's/.*"signup_token":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' /tmp/ytapi-signup.json)
curl -s -X POST https://ytapi.dev/api/agent/verify \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"signup_token\": \"$TOKEN\", \"code\": \"CODE\"}" \
-o /tmp/ytapi-verify.json
No suspicious patterns detected.