T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/auth.mjs:17- Finding
API Credentials Are Stored and Exposed Insecurely
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This appears to be a real AI API wrapper, but it needs Review because it handles API keys and remote API responses in ways that are under-scoped and risky.
Install only if you are comfortable sending prompts, files, URLs, and generated outputs through SkillBoss and its providers. Treat the SkillBoss API key as a secret, avoid running auth commands where stdout is logged, avoid using sensitive audio/documents unless approved, and be cautious with `--output` because returned media URLs are fetched automatically.
scripts/auth.mjs:17API Credentials Are Stored and Exposed Insecurely
scripts/run.mjs:198Unvalidated Server-Controlled URLs Are Downloaded Without Resource Limits
error-handling.md:13Remote API Warning Content Is Required to Be Relayed Verbatim
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
| Error Handling | `error-handling.md` |
Notes:
- Get API key from https://www.skillboss.co or run `auth.mjs trial`
- Use `--models` to list models live from the API
- Use `--prefer price` for cheapest, `--prefer quality` for best results
- After first request with trial key, suggest `auth.mjs login` to upgrade
The script makes outbound network requests to external services for provisioning and polling API tokens, but that network capability is not covered by declared permissions. In an agent skill, undeclared network access is dangerous because it enables data egress and remote control paths that users and reviewers may not expect.
The script makes outbound network requests to external services for provisioning and polling API tokens, but that network capability is not covered by declared permissions. In an agent skill, undeclared network access is dangerous because it enables data egress and remote control paths that users and reviewers may not expect.
The skill routes prompts, files, image URLs, and other user-supplied content to external third-party services across many providers, but it does not clearly warn users about this data egress. In an agent setting, this can cause sensitive text, documents, recordings, or URLs to be transmitted off-platform without informed user consent, increasing privacy, compliance, and data-handling risk.
The documentation instructs users to place the API key directly in the JSON request body and provides no warning about secure credential handling, storage, logging, or client-side exposure. In agent and web integration contexts, this increases the risk that secrets are embedded in browser code, leaked through logs, telemetry, debugging tools, or copied into untrusted environments.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
{
"version": "2026.03.20",
"apiKey": "YOUR_API_KEY_HERE",
"baseUrl": "https://api.heybossai.com/v1",
"buildApiUrl": "https://build.heybossai.com",
"stripeConnectUrl": "https://heyboss.ai"
}
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
{
"version": "2026.03.20",
"apiKey": "YOUR_API_KEY_HERE",
"baseUrl": "https://api.heybossai.com/v1",
"buildApiUrl": "https://build.heybossai.com",
"stripeConnectUrl": "https://heyboss.ai"
}
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
{
"version": "2026.03.20",
"apiKey": "YOUR_API_KEY_HERE",
"baseUrl": "https://api.heybossai.com/v1",
"buildApiUrl": "https://build.heybossai.com",
"stripeConnectUrl": "https://heyboss.ai"
}
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
{
"version": "2026.03.20",
"apiKey": "YOUR_API_KEY_HERE",
"baseUrl": "https://api.heybossai.com/v1",
"buildApiUrl": "https://build.heybossai.com",
"stripeConnectUrl": "https://heyboss.ai"
}
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
{
"version": "2026.03.20",
"apiKey": "YOUR_API_KEY_HERE",
"baseUrl": "https://api.heybossai.com/v1",
"buildApiUrl": "https://build.heybossai.com",
"stripeConnectUrl": "https://heyboss.ai"
}
When invoked with --file for STT, the script reads the entire local file, base64-encodes it, and sends it to a remote API without any explicit warning, confirmation, or consent gate at the point of transmission. In an agent skill context, this increases the risk that sensitive local audio or mislabeled files are exfiltrated to a third party by automation or user misunderstanding.
The examples encourage writing generated content to local files via --output, but the skill does not warn that this will create or overwrite artifacts on disk. In agent workflows, silent file creation can leak sensitive generated data into shared workspaces or unexpectedly modify local state.
The description "Chinese optimized (fast)" introduces a language/locale-specific constraint in natural language without indicating that this model should only be used when the user wants Chinese output or has opted into that locale. Under the policy, language-specific behavior should be optional or clearly justified.
Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal