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Security audit

UUScribe ASR

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed UUScribe transcription helper that uploads user-provided audio or public YouTube video references to the UUScribe API and returns results.

Install only if you are comfortable giving the skill access to your UUScribe API key and uploading selected local audio files or public YouTube video references to UUScribe. Pin or review the install source if supply-chain stability matters, and use --output only for paths you intend to write.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (6)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill declares significant capabilities (environment access, file writing, network, and shell execution) but does not explicitly constrain them with a tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This weakens least-privilege controls and can let an agent invoke the skill with broader access than necessary, increasing the blast radius if the skill is misused or its companion script is compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

md
## Prerequisites

1. The runtime needs Python 3.9+ and network access. Local audio also needs `ffprobe`.
2. Read `UUSCRIBE_API_KEY` from the environment. Do not ask the user to paste it into chat or a command argument, and never print it.
3. The default API URL is [https://scribe.uustudio.cc](https://scribe.uustudio.cc). Set `UUSCRIBE_API_BASE` only when the user explicitly specifies a self-hosted or development environment.
4. Use `ffprobe` to determine the actual duration of local audio; do not guess. If the user provides an accurate duration in seconds, use `--duration`.
5. The API key's account must have UUScribe API access and is subject to its balance, concurrency, and upload limits.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/transcribe.py (reported line 114)May include surrounding context.

python
def probe_duration(path: Path) -> int:
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            [
                "ffprobe",
                "-v",

Scope Creep

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.

Content

Scanner excerpt · LICENSE (reported line 7)May include surrounding context.

text
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so.

THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes the skill as handling speech-to-text, transcripts, subtitle text, and speaker-labeled segments. However, the result payload also includes summary and mindmap fields from the remote task, which expands the behavior beyond pure transcription-oriented output.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.dynamic_code_execution

Dynamic code execution detected.

Critical
Code
suspicious.dynamic_code_execution
Location
tests/test_transcribe.py:13