other
- Location
scripts/generate_report.py:25- Finding
Unredacted Agent Memory Content May Be Disclosed Through Generated Reports
- Content
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- Remediation
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This skill generates daily reports from local OpenClaw task memory and can export files, with no evidence of hidden network access, persistence, or destructive behavior.
Install this only if you are comfortable with it reading OpenClaw daily memory files and including matching task/list items in generated reports. Review reports before sharing or exporting them, especially DOCX files saved to the Desktop, because local memory may contain confidential work details.
scripts/generate_report.py:25Unredacted Agent Memory Content May Be Disclosed Through Generated Reports
The description omits meaningful resource access: the skill pulls content from local workspace files like memory/YYYY-MM-DD.md and PROJECTS.md, which may contain sensitive work data. Users may invoke a seemingly simple 'daily report' skill without realizing it will automatically inspect local files, creating a risk of unintended data exposure in generated reports or exports.
The description omits meaningful resource access: the skill pulls content from local workspace files like memory/YYYY-MM-DD.md and PROJECTS.md, which may contain sensitive work data. Users may invoke a seemingly simple 'daily report' skill without realizing it will automatically inspect local files, creating a risk of unintended data exposure in generated reports or exports.
The skill advertises behavior that reads from local memory files and can export reports, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions. That creates an authorization transparency gap: users and the hosting system may not understand that local files can be read and written when the skill is invoked.
The invocation phrases are broad enough that ordinary requests like '帮我写个日报' or '今天的日报' may trigger the skill automatically. Because the skill reads local memory/task files and may generate exports, accidental activation can cause unreviewed access to local data and unintended disclosure in the output.
The skill description highlights convenience features but does not warn that it automatically reads local memory/task files and can export reports to the desktop. This weakens informed consent and increases the chance that sensitive project information is gathered or written to a shared location without the user's awareness.
The example trigger phrase is generic and likely to overlap with common conversational requests. In this skill's context, that matters because a casual request can kick off local file access and report generation without the user clearly opting into those side effects.
The configuration sets "language": "zh-CN" and the documentation is written as if Chinese output is the default behavior, but the file does not present this as an optional user-selected setting. This can violate language/locale policy when a skill forces a specific language without explicit opt-in.
The schema hard-codes a default locale of "zh-CN" in the language setting, which can force a specific language unless the user explicitly overrides it. The policy allows locale constraints only when users are given an opt-in choice or the restriction is clearly justified, neither of which is expressed here.
The workflow explicitly says the agent will automatically read memory files to generate a report, but provides no notice, consent step, or scoping guidance about what memory data may be accessed. Because memory may contain sensitive personal or work information, this pattern can lead to over-collection and unintended disclosure in the generated report.
This example describes saving the generated report directly to the Desktop without warning that a local file will be created in a potentially visible location. If the report contains sensitive work summaries, this can expose data to other local users, backup/sync services, or accidental sharing.
The workflow instructs the agent to generate a Word document on the Desktop without any warning about file creation or local exposure. Word documents are easily forwarded or indexed by local/cloud software, so silently placing a report there can increase the chance of confidential information leaking.
This code sets the default language to "zh-CN", and the generated output strings throughout the script are hard-coded in Chinese. Because the file is a code file and there is no user-facing option to choose another language or opt into this locale, it violates the language/locale policy criterion.
This code includes user-facing documentation and CLI help/output in Chinese, such as the module docstring and multiple argparse/help strings, but does not provide an opt-in language selection or justify a locale-specific restriction. That creates a natural-language locale policy issue because the skill effectively assumes a specific language for users.
The packaging logic recursively includes every non-hidden file under the skill directory, with only minimal exclusions for dotfiles and pycache. This can unintentionally bundle sensitive or unrelated local artifacts such as test data, temporary exports, credentials stored in plain files, or large generated documents, causing unintended disclosure when the archive is shared or published.
All user prompts and assistant responses in the workflow documentation are presented exclusively in Chinese, with no indication that users may choose another language. This may amount to a language-policy issue if the skill is expected to support broader audiences unless the Chinese-only scope is explicitly documented.
No suspicious patterns detected.