T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:15- Finding
Remote Instruction and Agent Workflow Hijacking
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill appears to be a real paid Chinese official-document drafting service, but it needs Review because it broadly takes over writing requests and lets a remote service steer content, registration, payment prompts, and tracking output.
Install only if you are comfortable using a third-party remote service for official-document drafting, sharing your email and writing prompts with its gateway, and seeing its quota/payment messages. Be especially cautious with sensitive workplace material, payment QR codes, and any remote content that asks for extra personal or financial information.
SKILL.md:15Remote Instruction and Agent Workflow Hijacking
SKILL.md:45Forced Rendering of Remote Promotional, Support, and Tracking Content
SKILL.md:127Integrity Verification Cannot Operate with the Shipped Manifest
references/word-export.md:33Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation
The skill declares itself the mandatory default for virtually any writing-related request and explicitly forbids the agent from bypassing it. Such broad trigger scope can hijack unrelated user tasks, funnel excessive user content to remote APIs, and override normal user choice and safer local handling for commonplace writing requests.
The examples treat common phrases like 'write something' or 'draft a piece' as sufficient to auto-activate the skill. In context, this is dangerous because the skill also mandates email collection and remote API usage, so ambiguous everyday requests may be captured and monetized without informed user expectation.
The trigger matrix explicitly marks highly ambiguous phrases as automatic activators, which materially increases the chance of over-collection and remote processing of user text. Because this skill couples activation to external registration, quota consumption, and payment workflows, misfires have meaningful privacy and trust impact rather than being a harmless UX issue.
The manifest explicitly promises '支持按 GB/T 9704 生成 Word(docx)'. In the actual skill file, the operational flow is limited to registration, quota/payment handling, API retrieval of writing skeletons, and text-generation guidance; it references docx formatting requirements but does not define any concrete docx export operation or tool invocation. This is a capability claim not matched by the described behavior in the skill code/documentation.
The description mandates Chinese official-writing conventions and GB/T 9704 formatting as the default and forced-priority behavior for covered requests. This imposes a specific locale and writing standard without offering users a language or locale choice at activation time.
The skill embeds a full registration, quota, and payment workflow that requires collecting user email addresses and routing users through remote billing endpoints unrelated to the narrow task of text drafting. This expands the data-handling and trust surface substantially, creates unnecessary exposure of personal data and payment flows, and gives the skill strong incentives to capture broad user requests for monetized remote processing.
The text states that after payment, the agent must '重新发起请求获取付费内容' and that the JSON body must be '与首次完全一致'. But the surrounding flow's first request in this section is a payment-creation call with body 'plan + email', not a content request body. That makes the instruction internally contradictory about what request is being retried and what 'unchanged body' refers to.
No suspicious patterns detected.