T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:29- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 29–35
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned dependency installation from an external package repository
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
bash python3 -m pip install fcalendarbash python3 -m venv venv source venv/bin/activate # On Windows: venv\Scripts\activate python3 -m pip install fcalendarTechnical Analysis
The skill instructs the agent to install the latest available
fcalendarrelease from PyPI without specifying an exact version or verifying a cryptographic hash. Consequently, the dependency installed during future skill executions may differ from the package version available when this skill was audited.A virtual environment limits dependency conflicts but does not establish package integrity or prevent malicious installation and runtime code from executing. The external PyPI package and linked source repository are not included in this project artifact and therefore were not part of the audited code.
This creates a supply-chain exposure: compromise of the package, its maintainer account, or its release process could cause arbitrary Python code to execute when the package is installed or invoked.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the upstream
fcalendarpackage, its publishing credentials, or its release pipeline. - The attacker publishes a malicious package version to the expected PyPI project.
- A user submits a date- or time-related request that triggers this skill.
- The skill's package check fails because
fcalendaris not installed. - The agent runs
python3 -m pip install fcalendar. - Pip retrieves the current uncontrolled release and installs it.
- Malicious installation or runtime code executes with the operating-system privileges of the agent process.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution under the agent's account. Depending on that account's permissions and environment, the maliciou ...[truncated 396 chars]
- An attacker compromises the upstream
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the dependency to an exact, reviewed version, for example:
bash python3 -m pip install "fcalendar==<audited-version>" - Maintain a lock or requirements file containing cryptographic hashes and install with hash enforcement:
bash python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt - Audit the pinned source distribution and wheel before approving them.
- Prefer bundling a reviewed implementation in the skill artifact when licensing and maintenance requirements permit.
- Continue using an isolated virtual environment, but do not treat isolation as a substitute for provenance and integrity verification.
- Restrict the installation and runtime environment using least privilege, outbound network controls, and filesystem access controls.
- Define a controlled update process in which new dependency versions are reviewed and their hashes are updated explicitly.
- Pin the dependency to an exact, reviewed version, for example:
