T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:25- Finding
Mutable Remote Installation Script Is Executed Directly by a Shell
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This appears to be a real Wyckoff/A-share trading skill, but its setup and credential handling are risky enough that users should review it carefully before installing.
Review this before installing. Prefer a pinned, verified package in a virtual environment; do not run the curl-to-bash installer; avoid placing passwords or API keys directly in shell commands or MCP config files; and understand that the skill can register a persistent MCP tool, read saved Wyckoff credentials, and guide portfolio-changing commands. The TickFlow paid referral link should also be treated as commercial steering unless clearly disclosed by the publisher.
SKILL.md:25Mutable Remote Installation Script Is Executed Directly by a Shell
SKILL.md:68Unpinned Third-Party Package Is Installed and Registered as an MCP Tool
rules/cli-setup-guide.md:17Passwords and API Keys Are Passed Through Command-Line Arguments and Persisted Locally
SKILL.md:43Setup Flow Steers Users to a Paid Service Through an Undisclosed Referral Link
The | bash chaining pattern turns remote content into immediate shell execution, removing opportunities for inspection and magnifying the consequences of source compromise. In a skill that actively guides installation and setup, this is more dangerous than incidental documentation because users are likely to follow the exact command, leading to arbitrary command execution with the user's privileges.
Or one-line install:
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/YoungCan-Wang/Wyckoff-Analysis/main/install.sh | bash
After install, verify with `wyckoff --version` again.
The use of a pipe into bash is a chaining pattern that turns downloaded content directly into shell commands with no inspection boundary. This materially increases exploitability because any malicious modification to the downloaded script becomes immediate command execution under the user's privileges.
Alternative (one-line):
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/YoungCan-Wang/Wyckoff-Analysis/main/install.sh | bash
Verify: wyckoff --version
The guide tells users to pass email and password directly as CLI arguments, which can expose secrets through shell history, process listings, terminal logging, and audit systems. In shared or monitored environments, this can lead to credential theft and unauthorized account access.
The skill recommends a one-line curl ... | bash installation flow that downloads and immediately executes a remote script without verification. This creates a supply-chain execution risk: if the remote content, transport path, repository, or account is compromised, users may run arbitrary code on their machine. Because this is positioned as a primary install path in a setup guide, the skill materially increases the likelihood of unsafe execution.
The skill instructs users to pass email and password directly on the command line via wyckoff auth login <email> <password>. Command-line arguments are commonly exposed through shell history, process listings, terminal logging, and remote session audit trails, which can leak credentials to other local users or monitoring systems. In this setup-oriented skill, that risk is real because the instruction is explicit and normalized as the recommended login path.
L145 mandates printing 当前北京时间:YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM(UTC+8), and the fixed output contract at L186-L192 continues this Chinese-only format. The file does not state that the user can choose language or that the locale restriction is required for a region-specific compliance reason, so this is a natural-language locale policy issue.
The default prompt authorizes a very broad chain of actions: detecting local environment, guiding installation/configuration, fetching data from multiple sources, processing CSV/images/portfolio input, and directly executing CLI operations. Without explicit trigger boundaries or user-confirmation gates for sensitive steps, the agent could initiate or steer high-impact operational actions beyond the user's immediate intent, especially in a trading context where recommendations and portfolio actions are safety-sensitive.
The short description and default behavior are written to operate in a Chinese locale context, including Beijing-time trading-session logic, without indicating that locale/language should be chosen based on user preference. This can cause miscommunication, wrong market assumptions, or inappropriate behavior for users outside that language/market context, which is especially risky in a financial-analysis workflow.
These lines require that all user time references be interpreted exclusively as Asia/Shanghai and prohibit any other default timezone. This is a locale constraint imposed globally rather than offered as a choice, which fits the policy-violation category for forced locale behavior.
The prompt establishes a hard rule that every reply must include current Beijing time and determine trading-session status, while L133-L181 defines the core task as a continuous 'analyze first, then draw' workflow. However, L207 says that if it is intraday trading time, drawing should be skipped, which contradicts the earlier universal workflow framing rather than merely adding detail.
Lines L040-L046 require Chinese fonts to be loaded strictly via an explicit font file path and explicitly forbid using font.family, sans-serif, system default fonts, or vague font names. But L185 separately instructs automatic detection/loading of system Chinese fonts such as SimHei/CJK/Heiti, which contradicts the earlier hard rule because those are font names from the system environment rather than a guaranteed explicit file path workflow.
These lines mandate that chart annotations be in Chinese, with no indication that the user may choose another language. Forcing a specific language without opt-in is a natural-language policy violation under the stated rules.
The guide recommends installing by piping a remotely fetched script directly into bash. This is dangerous because it executes unreviewed code from a network source immediately on the user's machine, creating a straightforward supply-chain and command-execution risk if the remote content or transport is compromised.
The documentation includes a remote script piped to bash with no warning about its security implications. Users are not told they are trusting live network content for execution, which can conceal supply-chain compromise, account takeover tooling, or broader host compromise.
The note states credentials are automatically saved locally without explaining storage protections, file permissions, or privacy implications. Persisting login material on disk can expose accounts if the file is readable by other local users, copied in backups, or harvested by malware.
The guide instructs users to place API secrets in MCP configuration or environment variables without warning about disclosure risks. Secrets stored in plaintext config files or inherited environment variables may be exposed to other tools, logs, child processes, or source-control mistakes.
The setup guide documents operational capabilities well beyond a narrow analysis/onboarding scope, including log viewing, memory management, local database sync, cleanup, dashboard launch, and self-update. Expanding the documented command surface increases the chance that an agent or user will invoke privileged or state-altering actions that are not necessary for stock analysis, especially in an LLM-driven skill context where command guidance may be followed automatically.
The guided setup flow mandates the remote-script install as the exact first step, which normalizes unsafe execution and increases the likelihood users will run it without review. In a step-by-step agent workflow, presenting this as required can strongly bias automated or hurried execution of arbitrary remote code.
The guided flow repeats the unsafe remote installation command without any warning, reinforcing insecure behavior at the moment users are most likely to follow instructions verbatim. In an agent-assisted setup context, repeated presentation increases execution likelihood and amplifies supply-chain risk.
This markdown file defines activation triggers, so SQP-1 applies. The phrase "Any request requiring today/now/盘中/收盘后/明天 interpretation" is broad and overlaps with common everyday wording, without negative examples or constraints clarifying when the capability should not activate.
The instruction mandates converting time to Asia/Shanghai with no indication of user choice, opt-in, or documented justification for all uses. This is a natural-language locale policy issue because it imposes a specific locale unconditionally.
The trigger "Symbol analysis, near-current context, or trading-day validation" is underspecified, especially "near-current context," which could match many ordinary requests. The file does not provide negative examples or concrete constraints to distinguish when online retrieval should or should not run.
This section routes broad operational intents directly into wyckoff CLI execution, which increases the chance that ordinary user language triggers local command execution without sufficient confirmation or scoping. In an agent with local CLI integration, over-broad execution routing is security-relevant because it can expand the set of prompts that cause tool use, potentially leading to unintended state changes, configuration changes, or unsafe command invocation paths.
The external script fetching pattern is a genuine security concern here because it instructs users to retrieve and execute installer logic directly from GitHub at runtime. Even if the current script is benign, the trust boundary is weak and any future compromise of the source or dependency chain would immediately translate into local code execution on user systems.
Or one-line install:
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/YoungCan-Wang/Wyckoff-Analysis/main/install.sh | bash
After install, verify with `wyckoff --version` again.
This line fetches an external script from GitHub and immediately executes it, creating a classic supply-chain attack surface. Because the content is remote and mutable, any compromise of the repository, branch, or delivery path can result in arbitrary code execution on the local host.
Alternative (one-line):
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/YoungCan-Wang/Wyckoff-Analysis/main/install.sh | bash
Verify: wyckoff --version