T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/zy_platform.py:889- Finding
Pass-Through Route Restrictions Can Be Bypassed Using Encoded Path Traversal
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a coherent ZY Action Platform client, but it has real review-worthy risks around generic API pass-through controls and command-line credential handling.
Review this before installing. Use a dedicated low-privilege or read-only platform account, avoid giving passwords or bearer tokens as command-line arguments, clear cached tokens with logout when finished, and avoid the generic request pass-through for sensitive or administrative routes until its path canonicalization and URL redaction issues are fixed.
scripts/zy_platform.py:889Pass-Through Route Restrictions Can Be Bypassed Using Encoded Path Traversal
scripts/zy_platform.py:1068Passwords and Bearer Tokens Are Accepted Through Process-Visible Command-Line Arguments
scripts/zy_platform.py:966Generic Request Audit Records Can Store Sensitive Query Parameters Without Redaction
YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
---
name: zy-action-platform-en
display_name: ZY Action Platform Assistant
display_name_en: ZY Action Platform Assistant
description: "Connect and operate ZY Action Platform (AI Business Action System): guide verified install & DeepSeek key config, then health-check/login and, across the five products AIP/Foundry/Gotham/Apollo/Swift, run natural-language data queries, list/run automation workflows, query datasets/ontology, search intel, inspect deployments and more. Enforces HTTPS-only remote transport, origin-bound tokens and write confirmations."
description_zh: "连接并操作 ZY Action Platform(AI 商业行动系统):引导本机下载安装与 DeepSeek Key 配置;支持账号登录(令牌与源�
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- All platform calls go through the script `scripts/zy_platform.py` (pure Python standard library). Invocation: `python3 scripts/zy_platform.py <command> --prod
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- All platform calls go through the script `scripts/zy_platform.py` (pure Python standard library). Invocation: `python3 scripts/zy_platform.py <command> --prod
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- All platform calls go through the script `scripts/zy_platform.py` (pure Python standard library). Invocation: `python3 scripts/zy_platform.py <command> --prod
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- All platform calls go through the script `scripts/zy_platform.py` (pure Python standard library). Invocation: `python3 scripts/zy_platform.py <command> --prod
The client performs outbound HTTP(S) requests to configurable endpoints, yet the static finding indicates network capability is not declared. Undeclared network access is especially sensitive in an agent setting because it can exfiltrate prompts, credentials, or business data to remote systems without matching the permission model.
The client performs outbound HTTP(S) requests to configurable endpoints, yet the static finding indicates network capability is not declared. Undeclared network access is especially sensitive in an agent setting because it can exfiltrate prompts, credentials, or business data to remote systems without matching the permission model.
The client performs outbound HTTP(S) requests to configurable endpoints, yet the static finding indicates network capability is not declared. Undeclared network access is especially sensitive in an agent setting because it can exfiltrate prompts, credentials, or business data to remote systems without matching the permission model.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Authorization, cross-origin never carries it.
* Before sending credentials: login/--dry-run prints the normalized destination first;
the real login prints it to stderr as well.
* Storage: tokens prefer the OS credential store (optional keyring module); otherwise
fall back to ~/.workbuddy/zy_action_session.json (dir 0700 / file 0600 / atomic
replacement via temp file / symlinks rejected / ownership verified on POSIX).
Only the token and binding metadata are stored — no usernames. Expired entries are