Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Overview
The skill mostly matches its Hermes model-management purpose, but it can change live profile settings and includes credential checks that may print API keys into agent or terminal logs.
Review before installing. Use the skill only for intentional Hermes model administration, require confirmation before config changes or gateway restarts, and replace the .env grep examples with quiet presence checks that never print secret values. Do not let an agent echo or collect API keys from profile .env files.
The Skill's legitimate diagnostic requirement is only to determine whether a particular environment-variable name is present. Standard grep output includes the entire matching line, however, so these commands reveal both the variable name and its plaintext value.
The broad pattern at line 461 is particularly excessive because it can enumerate all key-like entries in the selected profile's .env file rather than checking only the credential required by the requested provider. The commands therefore exceed the minimum data access necessary for the declared model-management functionality.
No command in the audited file directly transmits the credentials to an external destination. Nevertheless, plaintext output may be incorporated into Agent context, command-execution records, terminal transcripts, screenshots, or other logs. The issue is an insecure credential-handling practice rather than confirmed malicious exfiltration.
Attack Path
A user asks the Agent to diagnose a missing provider credential or a provider-switching failure.
The Agent follows the Skill's troubleshooting instructions and runs one of the documented `gre
...[truncated 1183 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
Replace value-printing checks with quiet, name-anchored existence tests:
bash
if grep -qE '^ZHIPU_API_KEY=' ~/.hermes/profiles/<name>/.env; then
echo "ZHIPU_API_KEY is configured"
else
echo "ZHIPU_API_KEY is missing"
fi
Apply the following hardening measures:
Never print complete credential assignments during diagnostics.
Avoid broad patterns such as API_KEY|_KEY= that enumerate unrelated secrets.
Anchor checks to an exact variable name at the beginning of a line.
Prefer a Hermes-native credential-status command if one is available and guarantees value redaction.
Ensure .env files have restrictive permissions, such as mode 600.
Redact credential values from Agent tool output, application logs, and terminal recordings.
For credential creation, avoid unconditional commands such as:
bash
Instead, securely prompt for the value without echoing it, update the existing assignment atomically, prevent duplicate entries, and preserve restrictive permissions.
Rotate any credentials that may already have appeared in retained Agent or terminal logs.
The skill instructs using grep against a profile .env to inspect API key material. Even if intended for troubleshooting, this encourages the agent to access secret-bearing files and may expose credential names or values in logs, terminal output, or chat responses.
Content
Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 461)May include surrounding context.
This command checks for a specific API key in .env, which still requires reading a credential file and may reveal secret-bearing lines if executed carelessly. In agent workflows, normalizing secret-file inspection increases the risk of accidental disclosure or overcollection.
Content
Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 464)May include surrounding context.
The skill instructs appending an API key directly into a .env file via shell command. This promotes handling raw secrets in command history and agent-visible text, creating a concrete credential exposure path if outputs, prompts, or shell history are retained.
Content
Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 468)May include surrounding context.
The preventive check again encourages the agent to read from .env and report on credential presence. While less severe than printing values, it still expands the agent's interactions with secret storage and can leak details about configured providers.
Content
Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 477)May include surrounding context.
The FAQ repeats advice to inspect .env for keys, reinforcing a workflow where the agent accesses secret material. Repetition matters here because it normalizes credential-file reads as standard operation, increasing the chance of accidental exposure.
Content
Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 635)May include surrounding context.
This FAQ example tells the user to append a raw API key to .env, which risks disclosure through shell history, terminal logs, and any agent transcript. For an agent skill, that is especially dangerous because the agent may be tempted to handle or repeat the secret in plaintext.
Content
Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 638)May include surrounding context.
This example promotes conditional logic based on reading a secret file, again extending agent access to credential storage. Even though it checks presence rather than value, it is still unnecessary secret-file interaction for routine model switching.
Content
Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 721)May include surrounding context.
The skill instructs the agent to auto-load on very broad phrases like asking what model is in use or diagnosing generic issues. In an agentic environment, overbroad triggers can activate configuration-management behavior during ordinary conversation, increasing the chance of unintended access to profile state or follow-on config changes without clear user intent.
Content
No source excerpt is available for this finding.
Missing User Warnings
Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The documented flow tells the agent to execute operations and then restart the gateway, but it does not consistently require warning or confirmation before applying destructive configuration changes. Because these actions alter live model routing and service state, accidental invocation could disrupt service, break profiles, or switch traffic to unintended providers.
Content
No source excerpt is available for this finding.
External Transmission
Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content
Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 297)May include surrounding context.