Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Overview
This log analyzer needs review because installation can update several agents without the promised confirmation, and report output can overwrite source logs.
Choose one explicit --agent or --dir and preview with --dry-run; avoid default or global installation until its confirmation behavior is fixed. Back up existing skill files. Analyze read-only log copies, specify individual files to avoid unexpected recursion, and save reports to a new file outside the inputs. Reports contain original log evidence. The scanner's installer gaps were independently investigated; actual installations and external npm releases were not tested. Prefer the reviewed bundle or a pinned release over unversioned npx commands.
Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)
T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
Location
.
Finding
Installers do not enforce the documented multi-target confirmation boundary
Content
View full analysis
Impact
A default invocation can replace Skill contents across multiple agent installations without the promised target selection or confirmation, affecting subsequent agent sessions and removing existing installation files.
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
Content
Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 147)May include surrounding context.
md
| auth | credential_stuffing | high | One source tries many different usernames |
| auth | abnormal_login | high | Multiple failures then a success from the same source |
| auth | root_login | medium | Direct login as root from a source |
| auth | sudo_escalation / sudo_attempt | medium~high | sudo escalation / privilege attempt (not in sudoers) |
| web | path_traversal | high | Path traversal (../ or encoded variants) |
| web | sql_injection | high | SQL injection patterns |
| web | webshell_upload | critical | webshell upload / access trace |
Chaining Abuse
High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
Content
Scanner excerpt · README.zh-CN.md (reported line 162)May include surrounding context.
md
| auth | credential_stuffing | high | 同源尝试多个不同用户名 |
| auth | abnormal_login | high | 同源多次失败后成功登录 |
| auth | root_login | medium | 来源以 root 直登 |
| auth | sudo_escalation / sudo_attempt | medium~high | sudo 提权 / 越权(not in sudoers) |
| web | path_traversal | high | 路径穿越(../ 或编码变体) |
| web | sql_injection | high | SQL 注入特征 |
| web | webshell_upload | critical | webshell 上传 / 访问轨迹 |
Chaining Abuse
High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
Content
Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 91)May include surrounding context.
md
| auth | credential_stuffing | high | 同源尝试多个不同用户名 |
| auth | abnormal_login | high | 同源多次失败后成功登录 |
| auth | root_login | medium | 来源以 root 直登 |
| auth | sudo_escalation / sudo_attempt | medium~high | sudo 提权 / 越权(not in sudoers) |
| web | path_traversal | high | 路径穿越(../ 或编码变体) |
| web | sql_injection | high | SQL 注入特征 |
| web | webshell_upload | critical | webshell 上传 / 访问轨迹 |
Description-Behavior Mismatch
High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The supplied chunk has an installation purpose rather than the declared log-analysis purpose. Although installation can support a skill, these behaviors go beyond incidental implementation details under the explicit read-only boundary: installTo() and copyDir() create directories and overwrite files, while cleanResidue() and safeRemove() delete installation artifacts. These operations affect skill directories, not log contents; there is no evidence that this chunk modifies logs, accesses the network, or actively scans systems. The mismatch is the undeclared filesystem-mutating installation behavior, not evidence of malicious intent. Other, unsupplied files may implement the advertised analysis capabilities.
Content
No source excerpt is available for this finding.
Description-Behavior Mismatch
High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
Installation can be a supporting activity, but this chunk implements filesystem deployment and cleanup with material side effects beyond the declared read-only scope. install_to and copy_tree use mkdir and cp, while clean_residue uses rm -rf and find -delete on existing installation contents. No log parsing, detection, timeline generation, or report generation appears in the supplied code. There is no evidence of networking, active scanning, or modification of input logs; the mismatch concerns undisclosed installation writes and deletions, not malicious intent.
Content
No source excerpt is available for this finding.
Credential Access
High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Content
Scanner excerpt · references/web-log-rules.md (reported line 10)May include surrounding context.
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
Content
Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.
md
## Core value
- **Zero-dependency engine** — four log parsers + detection rules built entirely with Python 3.8+ standard library; no SIEM or external scanners.
- **Four log families** — auth/secure (brute-force / abnormal login / sudo escalation), Web access logs (scans / webshell / traversal / SQLi / suspicious UA), PowerShell script blocks (encoded / download-execute / reflection / AMSI bypass / obfuscation), Windows Event Log (login failures / abnormal login / account ops / log clearing / suspicious process).
- **Automatic type sniffing** — no need to specify the log type; it judges by line heuristics, or force it with `--type`.
- **Timeline + Chinese explanations** — hits are sorted by time; each includes type, severity, evidence line, Chinese explanation and a review suggestion.
- **Three output modes** — text / JSON (clean stdout) / Markdown report; `--output` writes to a file.
Sudo/Root Execution
Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
Content
Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 147)May include surrounding context.
md
| auth | credential_stuffing | high | One source tries many different usernames |
| auth | abnormal_login | high | Multiple failures then a success from the same source |
| auth | root_login | medium | Direct login as root from a source |
| auth | sudo_escalation / sudo_attempt | medium~high | sudo escalation / privilege attempt (not in sudoers) |
| web | path_traversal | high | Path traversal (../ or encoded variants) |
| web | sql_injection | high | SQL injection patterns |
| web | webshell_upload | critical | webshell upload / access trace |
Sudo/Root Execution
Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
Content
Scanner excerpt · README.zh-CN.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.