Back to skill

Security audit

Planit

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

PlanIt is a travel-planning skill, but it sends user travel data and optional bearer credentials to a hardcoded plaintext HTTP backend and its telemetry does not match its privacy claims.

Review this skill carefully before installing. It may send travel requests, user identifiers, origin/destination context, action choices, feedback, configuration, and any PLANIT_SECRET bearer token to a remote backend over plaintext HTTP by default. Do not use it with sensitive travel details or credentials unless the endpoint is explicitly configured to a trusted HTTPS service and telemetry practices are clarified.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (4)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
src/server-client.js:8
Finding

Default Plaintext HTTP Transport Exposes User Data and Bearer Credentials

Content
View full analysis
{ const lib = url.protocol === 'https:' ? https : http; const req = lib.request({ hostname: url.hostname, port: url.port || (url.protocol === 'https:' ? 443 : 80), path: url.pathname + url.search, method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(payload), ...(secret ? { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${secret}` } : {}), }, timeout: 10000, }, (res) => { ``` The complete incoming message is forwarded at `src/server-client.js:56-58`: ```js async function plan(message, skillConfig) { return postJson('/plan', { ...message, skillConfig: skillConfig || null }); } ``` ### Technical Analysis The default backend is a hard-coded public IP using plaintext HTTP. The client explicitly supports both HTTP and HTTPS but does not enforce HTTPS or reject insecure URLs. The request body contains the complete message object and may therefore include the user's identifier, travel request, origin location, context, action payload, and skill configuration. When `PLANIT_SECRET` is set, the same plain ...[truncated 1659 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
src/index.js:20
Finding

Telemetry Collection Contradicts Privacy Claims and Sends Raw Identifiers and Travel Details

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
src/server-client.js:36
Finding

Unbounded HTTP Response Buffering Allows Memory Exhaustion

Content
View full analysis
{ const chunks = []; res.on('data', (c) => chunks.push(c)); res.on('end', () => { const raw = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8'); let json = null; try { json = JSON.parse(raw); } catch { /* ignore */ } if (res.statusCode >= 400) { return reject(new Error(json?.error || json?.message || `HTTP ${res.statusCode}`)); } resolve(json); }); }); ``` ### Technical Analysis Every response chunk is retained in the `chunks` array until the response ends. There is no maximum response size, no validated `Content-Length` threshold, and no streaming parser. `Buffer.concat(chunks)` then allocates additional contiguous memory for the complete body, increasing peak memory consumption. The 10-second request timeout does not adequately bound response size. A server can deliver a large body quickly, or repeatedly deliver chunks before timeout behavior terminates the connection. Because the backend URL is configurable and the default remote service is outside this package, the client must treat backend responses as untrusted. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the configured backend, controls a custom backend URL, or manipulates plaintext HTTP traffic. 2. The attacker responds to `/plan`, `/telemetry`, or `/contributions` with a very large response body. 3. The client appends every received chunk to the in-memory array. 4. At response completion, `Buffer.concat` creates another large allocation. 5. The Node.js process experiences excessive memory consumption, garbage-collection pressure, or an out-of-memory termination. 6. The agent or host process becomes unavailable to users. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation can deny service to the Node.js process hosting the s ...[truncated 314 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
{ received += chunk.length; if (received > MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES) { req.destroy(new Error('Response exceeds size limit')); return; } chunks.push(chunk); }); ``` 4. Validate that the response content type is an expected JSON media type. 5. Consider a bounded streaming JSON parser if large legitimate responses are required. 6. Add tests for oversized declared and chunked responses. 7. Apply limits at both the client and backend or reverse-proxy layers. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
test/test.js:25
Finding

Default Test Execution Sends Data to a Live Public Backend

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (9)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The trigger list includes many generic terms such as 'plan', 'route', 'guide', 'trip', and 'travel' that are common in everyday prompts. This can cause the skill to activate unintentionally for unrelated requests, expanding its access and behavior surface beyond user intent and potentially hijacking prompts that should go to another skill or the base model.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest description says the skill works with "just one natural language sentence," but does not specify what kinds of sentences are valid or how travel-planning requests are distinguished from ordinary conversation. This broad phrasing can create ambiguity about when the skill should activate and increases the risk of unintended invocation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The code sends telemetry containing user identifiers, free-text request metadata, and travel/action details to an external server path that is not necessary for the core message-handling behavior shown here. In a travel-planning context, destination choices, item selections, and persistent user IDs can reveal sensitive behavioral and location-related information, especially because no minimization, consent, or opt-out controls are evident in this file.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Telemetry is emitted with userId plus request/action metadata, but this file provides no user-facing disclosure, consent flow, or indication that such data is collected. Hidden collection of identifiers and trip-related metadata creates a privacy/security risk because users may unknowingly expose personal preferences and movement-related information to backend systems.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The help title, message, and all examples are presented only in Chinese, and the text implies the skill expects one-sentence travel requests in that language. There is no opt-in, alternative locale, or documented justification that this skill is intentionally restricted to Chinese-speaking users.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

An authorization bearer secret from PLANIT_SECRET is automatically attached to outbound requests, which means credentials are sent to whatever server URL is configured or defaulted. Because the code permits plain HTTP and ships with a hardcoded HTTP IP default, the token can be exposed in transit or sent to an untrusted endpoint, enabling unauthorized service access or impersonation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The plan() function forwards arbitrary message content and skillConfig to a remote /plan endpoint, which can include sensitive prompts, user data, and internal configuration. The risk is amplified because the default server URL is a hardcoded plain-HTTP IP address, so data may be transmitted to an unexpected or interceptable destination without confidentiality or clear user awareness.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The telemetry() function silently sends event data to a remote server and suppresses errors, making the data flow easy to miss during operation and harder to audit. If telemetry contains prompts, identifiers, usage data, or environment-derived context, this creates an undisclosed exfiltration channel; the insecure default HTTP server further increases interception risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This code file contains multiple user-facing strings and comments in Chinese, including section labels, assertions, and error/output messages, with no indication that the skill supports alternative languages or that Chinese-only behavior is intentionally limited to a region-specific context. The policy for natural-language content requires flagging forced language or locale usage when there is no opt-in or justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.