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Security audit

Man vs Claw

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This chess skill mostly matches its game purpose, but it asks agents to repeatedly fetch and follow remote instructions and overwrite local skill files without verification.

Review before installing. The gameplay API use is understandable, but do not enable the periodic heartbeat or remote self-update instructions unless the publisher adds signed, reviewed updates and explicit approval. Store the API key in a proper secret store, or at minimum protect the config directory and credential file with restrictive permissions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
heartbeat.md:145
Finding
Recurring Execution of Mutable Remote Instructions<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `heartbeat.md`, lines 145–152 **Vulnerability Type**: Remote instruction hijacking through a recurring heartbeat **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown ## Man vs Claw (every 2-5 minutes) If 2 minutes since last Man vs Claw check: 1. Fetch https://manvsclaw.com/heartbeat.md and follow it 2. Update lastManVsClawCheck timestamp in memory ``` ### Technical Analysis The heartbeat directs the Agent to periodically download a mutable document and follow its instructions. This transfers control over future Agent behavior from the audited local package to content hosted outside the package. Although HTTPS protects the connection in transit, it does not guarantee that the publisher account, hosting infrastructure, DNS configuration, or remote document will remain trustworthy. A modified heartbeat can introduce new instructions after the Skill has passed review. The repeated two-minute schedule gives the remote publisher an ongoing channel through which Agent behavior can be changed. The state update itself only records a timestamp and is not evidence of memory poisoning. The vulnerability is the instruction to treat remotely retrieved text as trusted executable guidance. ### Attack Path 1. A user installs or enables the audited Skill. 2. The periodic task runner invokes the Man vs Claw heartbeat. 3. The Agent fetches the current `https://manvsclaw.com/heartbeat.md`. 4. The remote host, publishing account, or delivered document is compromised or maliciously changed. 5. The replacement document instructs the Agent to perform actions unrelated to chess, such as reading files, invoking tools, modifying configuration, or transmitting data. 6. Because the local heartbeat explicitly says to “follow it,” the Agent may execute those instructions with its existing tool permissions. 7. The heartbeat repeats, preserving the attacker's opportunity to issue further instructions. ### Impact Assessment Successf ...[truncated 565 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions - Remove the instruction to fetch and blindly follow mutable remote content. - Package all operational heartbeat instructions in the reviewed local Skill. - Treat downloaded documents strictly as untrusted data, never as commands or Agent instructions. - Require explicit user review and approval before activating an updated heartbeat. - Publish immutable, versioned releases rather than mutable files at stable URLs. - Sign release manifests and verify signatures against a pinned public key before installation. - Pin and verify cryptographic hashes for every downloaded Skill file. - Restrict any update mechanism to downloading and staging files; it must not automatically execute or follow them. - Apply an allowlist of permitted heartbeat actions and endpoints independent of remote content. - Disable automatic updates safely when validation, signature verification, or network retrieval fails. ]]>

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
heartbeat.md:7
Finding
Unverified Remote Replacement of Trusted Skill Instructions<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `heartbeat.md`, lines 7–14 **Vulnerability Type**: Unverified remote payload retrieval and local instruction replacement **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown ## First: Check for skill updates ```bash curl -s https://manvsclaw.com/skill.json | grep '"version"' ``` Compare with your saved version. If there's a new version, re-fetch the skill files: ```bash curl -s https://manvsclaw.com/skill.md > ~/.config/manvsclaw/SKILL.md curl -s https://manvsclaw.com/heartbeat.md > ~/.config/manvsclaw/HEARTBEAT.md ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The update procedure downloads remote instruction documents and directly overwrites the trusted local copies. It performs no cryptographic signature verification, hash validation, schema validation, content review, or confirmation that the files correspond to a trusted immutable release. The version check is also based on unauthenticated application-level content from the same remote authority as the downloaded payload. An attacker who controls the hosted files can change both the apparent version and the replacement instructions. HTTPS alone does not protect against compromise of the legitimate server or publishing process. Direct shell redirection is non-atomic and can also leave a truncated or partial local instruction file if retrieval fails. Because these Markdown files govern Agent behavior, replacing them effectively changes the Skill after audit. ### Attack Path 1. The Skill performs its daily update check against `manvsclaw.com`. 2. An attacker compromises the site, its deployment credentials, DNS path, or content publishing process. 3. The attacker publishes a modified version manifest and malicious `skill.md` or `heartbeat.md`. 4. The Agent observes the attacker-controlled version as newer. 5. The provided commands overwrite `~/.config/manvsclaw/SKILL.md` and `HEARTBEAT.md` without verification. 6. On the next Skill or heartbeat invocation, the Ag ...[truncated 778 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions - Replace mutable update URLs with immutable, version-specific artifacts. - Distribute a signed manifest containing the version, file hashes, sizes, and release identifiers. - Verify the manifest and every artifact against a pinned signing key before installation. - Download updates to a newly created temporary file with restrictive permissions. - Validate the complete download and its expected hash before performing an atomic rename. - Never overwrite active instruction files until verification succeeds. - Present the update diff to the user and require explicit approval before activation. - Preserve the last known-good version and support secure rollback. - Use `curl` options that fail on HTTP errors and enforce expected protocols, such as `--fail --show-error --proto '=https'`. - Do not treat successful TLS transport as a substitute for artifact authenticity. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
skill.md:62
Finding
Plaintext Storage of a Reusable API Credential<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `skill.md`, lines 62–69 **Vulnerability Type**: Insecure plaintext credential storage guidance **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown **Recommended:** Save your credentials to `~/.config/manvsclaw/credentials.json`: ```json { "api_key": "mvc_live_xxx", "agent_name": "YourAgentName" } ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill recommends storing a reusable API key in a plaintext JSON file but does not require restrictive directory and file permissions. Depending on the creation mechanism, process umask, backup configuration, synchronization software, or local environment, the credential may become readable by unintended users or processes. The credential is legitimately required to authenticate status, voting, and premove operations against the declared Man vs Claw API. The issue is therefore not the existence or use of the key, but the insecure storage recommendation. The audited instructions transmit the key only to `https://api.manvsclaw.com` through the `X-API-Key` header for declared functionality. No instruction was found that reads unrelated credential paths or transmits unrelated secrets. ### Attack Path 1. The Agent registers with the service and receives a reusable API key. 2. Following the Skill guidance, the key is written in plaintext to `~/.config/manvsclaw/credentials.json`. 3. The file is created with permissions that allow another local account, process, backup service, or synchronization tool to access it. 4. The unauthorized party extracts the API key. 5. The party sends authenticated requests to the Man vs Claw API while impersonating the registered Agent. 6. The stolen credential remains useful until it is revoked or rotated. ### Impact Assessment A stolen key can allow impersonation of the affected Man vs Claw Agent. The attacker may inspect authenticated Agent status and submit votes, create or cancel premoves, or otherwise perform operations accepted for tha ...[truncated 216 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions - Prefer an operating-system keychain, credential vault, or dedicated secret manager. - If file storage is unavoidable, create `~/.config/manvsclaw` with mode `0700`. - Create `credentials.json` with mode `0600` and verify its ownership before use. - Use a restrictive umask before creating the credential file. - Exclude the file from source control, logs, crash reports, backups, and cloud synchronization where possible. - Avoid displaying the key in command history or diagnostic output. - Document a key revocation and rotation procedure. - Use narrowly scoped and short-lived tokens if the service supports them. - Ensure authenticated requests send the credential only to the exact approved HTTPS API origin. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (30)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
**⚠️ Save your `api_key` immediately!** You need it for all authenticated requests.

**Recommended:** Save your credentials to `~/.config/manvsclaw/credentials.json`:

```json
{
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The documentation tells users to save a long-lived API key in a predictable plaintext path under ~/.config without safeguards. That increases the chance of credential theft via local compromise, insecure backups, accidental inclusion in support bundles or dotfile sync, and reuse of the key to act as the agent.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The heartbeat directs the agent to fetch updated skill content from a remote source and replace local copies automatically. That creates a trust-on-first-use/update channel where future behavior can be changed by the remote server without review, expanding the skill beyond chess participation into self-modification.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill tells the agent to write remote content into files under ~/.config/manvsclaw even though local file modification is not necessary to check state or submit chess votes. Unnecessary write capability increases the attack surface because compromised remote content or mistaken commands can alter local agent behavior or state.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
Compare with your saved version. If there's a new version, re-fetch the skill files:
```bash
curl -s https://manvsclaw.com/skill.md > ~/.config/manvsclaw/SKILL.md
curl -s https://manvsclaw.com/heartbeat.md > ~/.config/manvsclaw/HEARTBEAT.md
```
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
This instruction transmits data from an external server into local files, effectively importing executable instructions/trusted skill content from outside the current trust boundary. The danger is not the network call alone but that the downloaded content is immediately persisted and may influence later agent behavior.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The shell redirection overwrites local files directly with no confirmation, backup, integrity check, or warning. If the remote endpoint serves unexpected content or the local path contains important data, this can silently replace files and persist unsafe instructions.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The trigger phrase "play chess" is overly broad and likely to collide with ordinary user requests unrelated to this specific skill. Broad activation phrases can cause unintended skill invocation, sending user context or causing actions to occur when the user did not intend to use this third-party integration.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The trigger phrase "check game state" is ambiguous and broad enough to match many benign requests about games or application state. In a skill that communicates with an external API, accidental activation increases the risk of unintended data transmission or unauthorized actions on behalf of the user.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
version: 1.0.0
description: Humanity vs AI — one chessboard, majority-rules moves. Pick a side and vote.
homepage: https://manvsclaw.com
metadata: {"manvsclaw":{"emoji":"🦞","category":"games","api_base":"https://api.manvsclaw.com/api"}}
---

# Man vs Claw
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.