Alibabacloud Sdk Client Initialization For Python

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 15, 2026 · 1:30 AM UTC
• Version: 0.0.1-beta

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Alibaba Cloud Python SDK setup guide with expected credential and package-install examples, and no hidden execution or persistence behavior.

Install the SDK packages in a virtual environment and pin reviewed versions or hashes if you need reproducible builds; only set Alibaba Cloud credentials in the intended environment variables for projects that should access that account.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:65

Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 65–69
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned dependencies installed from the active Python package index
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

markdown

## SDK Components

| Component | Install Command |
|-----------|----------------|
| Core SDK | `pip install alibabacloud-tea-openapi` |
| Product SDK | `pip install alibabacloud_ecs20140526` (example) |

Technical Analysis

The documented installation commands do not constrain package versions, verify artifact hashes, or enforce an approved package index. Consequently, executing these commands installs whichever package release is selected by the active Python package repository and resolver at installation time.

This makes the installed code mutable after the Skill has been reviewed. A compromised package repository, compromised future package release, or maliciously configured package index could cause pip to retrieve an unreviewed artifact. Depending on package format and installer behavior, malicious package code may execute during installation or when the dependency is imported and used.

The finding concerns supply-chain hardening. The audited document does not itself contain a malicious dependency, remote script, or confirmed compromised package.

Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises a referenced package release, its publishing account, or a Python package index configured in the user's environment.
2. The attacker publishes a malicious artifact under a version accepted by the unconstrained installation command.
3. A user follows the Skill documentation and runs the relevant pip install command.
4. pip resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled or compromised artifact because no reviewed version or hash is required.
5. Malicious code executes during package installation or later when the installed SDK is imported.
6. The payload operates with the permissions and environmen ...[truncated 739 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Pin every dependency to a specifically reviewed version rather than allowing unconstrained resolution.
2. Maintain dependencies in a lock file or requirements file containing cryptographic hashes.
3. Install with hash verification, for example:

   bash

   python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt
   

4. Route installations through an approved, authenticated package mirror and explicitly configure the trusted index.
5. Review package provenance and release integrity before updating pinned versions.
6. Perform dependency installation in an isolated virtual environment or container under a non-privileged account.
7. In CI/CD environments, restrict dependency-installation network access and avoid exposing unrelated secrets during installation.
8. Add automated dependency and software-composition scanning to detect compromised, vulnerable, or unexpected transitive packages.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.