T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
scripts/geo_quota.py:274- Finding
Unauthenticated local upgrade commands bypass paid-tier quota restrictions
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is mostly a brand visibility monitor, but it needs Review because it sends business search data to external services and ships weak API/licensing controls.
Install only if you are comfortable sending brand names, search prompts/results, license checks, and optional reports to external AI platforms, yk-global, Tavily, and Feishu. Do not deploy the bundled API service as-is; replace the placeholder key, add real auth and rate limits, and fix the local upgrade and temporary-report handling first.
scripts/geo_quota.py:274Unauthenticated local upgrade commands bypass paid-tier quota restrictions
api/geo_api.py:21Repository-known placeholder key authenticates to the API service
scripts/geo_report.py:139Predictable shared temporary report path permits symlink overwrite
Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.
def search_brand_tavily(brand_name, max_results=5):
"""使用Tavily搜索品牌信息"""
try:
response = requests.post(
TAVILY_API_URL,
json={
"api_key": TAVILY_API_KEY,
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
This second mismatch finding also points to materially misleading capability claims, especially around AI-based causal analysis, webhook pushing, and competitor monitoring. In an agent ecosystem, overstated automation and hidden reliance on external systems can lead to unintended disclosure, improper operator trust, and unsafe business decisions based on incomplete or fabricated functionality.
This second mismatch finding also points to materially misleading capability claims, especially around AI-based causal analysis, webhook pushing, and competitor monitoring. In an agent ecosystem, overstated automation and hidden reliance on external systems can lead to unintended disclosure, improper operator trust, and unsafe business decisions based on incomplete or fabricated functionality.
This service performs outbound requests to Tavily using user-supplied brand queries, but that network capability is not reflected in the declared permissions. Undeclared external transmission is dangerous because users and reviewers cannot accurately assess data exposure or constrain the skill's runtime behavior.
This service performs outbound requests to Tavily using user-supplied brand queries, but that network capability is not reflected in the declared permissions. Undeclared external transmission is dangerous because users and reviewers cannot accurately assess data exposure or constrain the skill's runtime behavior.
The skill has shell-capable behavior through subprocess execution, but this capability is not declared in permissions. Undeclared execution capability is dangerous because it weakens review transparency and can allow networked command execution paths that operators and users did not explicitly approve.
The skill uses 'file_read' capability that is not listed in its permissions. This may indicate deceptive intent or missing permission declarations.
The skill uses 'file_write' capability that is not listed in its permissions. This may indicate deceptive intent or missing permission declarations.
The documentation states that paid tiers are unlocked through API verification, but the implementation also supports local tier escalation by mutating the quota file. This discrepancy can mislead reviewers and operators into trusting a licensing control that is easily bypassed, weakening control integrity and making abuse more likely.
The module exposes local functions that directly mutate the quota state to 'pro' or 'enterprise' without any API-key verification or server-side authorization. Any caller able to invoke these functions, or to edit the quota file equivalently, can bypass licensing restrictions and unlock unrestricted execution.
The README explicitly advertises a server-side relay and Feishu webhook integration but does not explain what brand queries, prompts, results, or identifiers may be transmitted, stored, or retained. In a skill that monitors brand visibility across third-party AI platforms, this omission can cause users to unknowingly send potentially sensitive business intelligence or internal brand-monitoring data to external services.
The triggers are broad and generic for a skill that can invoke local scripting and potentially perform external requests, increasing the chance of accidental activation in unrelated brand, AI, or monitoring conversations. Unintended invocation can cause unnecessary data collection, quota consumption, external transmission, or execution of automation without sufficiently specific user intent.
The skill documents outbound API use, server-side relay, and webhook pushing without a clear, prominent user warning about external data transmission. This is dangerous because brand names, queries, API keys, and report contents may be sent to third parties or custom webhooks without users fully understanding the data path and retention implications.
The documented external endpoint and server relay indicate intentional off-host data transmission to a vendor-controlled API. While external communication is not inherently malicious, it is security-relevant here because the skill handles user-supplied brand intelligence inputs and license/API credentials, and the relay architecture reduces local visibility into what is transmitted or retained.
- ✅ 我们服务器中转,无需本地环境
- ✅ 稳定高效,不封IP
> 购买专业版/企业版后,请在 [https://yk-global.com](https://yk-global.com) 获取API密钥,使用 `--api-key YOUR_KEY` 参数运行即可解锁全部功能。验证接口:`POST https://api.yk-global.com/v1/verify`,验证失败自动降级到免费版,不阻断使用。
## 支持的AI平台
This code includes natural-language content exclusively in Chinese in the module description and runtime error messages, with no indication that the skill is region-specific or that users can opt into the locale. That creates a language policy concern because the skill effectively mandates a specific language for operators and API consumers.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
TAVILY_API_KEY = os.environ.get('TAVILY_API_KEY', '')
if not TAVILY_API_KEY:
raise ValueError("请设置 TAVILY_API_KEY 环境变量")
TAVILY_API_URL = "https://api.tavily.com/search"
# API认证(简易版:检查X-API-Key头)
API_KEYS = {
The manifest describes automatic visibility checks on several specific AI platforms and generation of analysis about why a brand was not recommended. In this file, the implemented behavior is a single POST request to Tavily with a generic query, which is materially narrower than the advertised platform-specific monitoring capability.
The endpoint sends user-provided brand queries and the service's API credential to an external third party (Tavily). In the context of a brand-monitoring skill, external transmission is expected, but it is still security-relevant because user inputs may contain sensitive business terms and are disclosed to a provider outside the local trust boundary.
def search_brand_tavily(brand_name, max_results=5):
"""使用Tavily搜索品牌信息"""
try:
response = requests.post(
TAVILY_API_URL,
json={
"api_key": TAVILY_API_KEY,
The manifest promises higher-level reasoning and notification features, but the code computes a simplified score solely from result count and exposes no analysis logic or Feishu push behavior. This is a meaningful mismatch between claimed product behavior and implemented functionality in this file.
This Python file contains user-facing natural-language strings entirely in Chinese, including the module docstring, function docstring, and console output. Under the policy rule for natural-language violations, forcing a specific language without user opt-in or documented regional justification is a locale-policy issue.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
def test_search(brand="91tokenhub"):
"""测试搜索"""
resp = requests.post(
API_URL,
headers={"X-API-Key": TEST_KEY},
json={"brand": brand, "max_results": 5}
The config sets the report language to "zh-CN" unconditionally. This is a natural-language locale constraint, and the file does not indicate any user opt-in, alternative locale selection, or region-specific justification for forcing Chinese output.
The module description, prompt, fallback analysis, and CLI usage strings are all written exclusively in Chinese, which effectively fixes the skill's interaction language. The file does not offer a language choice or explain that the skill is intentionally region-specific, so this is a locale policy concern.