Anime Garden

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 11, 2026 · 7:30 AM UTC
• Version: 0.0.1

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Anime Garden API helper that sends anime search terms to a third-party torrent index, with no hidden execution, persistence, or credential handling found.

Install only if you are comfortable with an agent sending your anime search and filter terms to api.animes.garden and receiving torrent or magnet-related resource information. Treat returned torrent resources as untrusted third-party content and consider legal and safety implications before downloading anything.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• System Prompt Leakage: Direct Leakage, Indirect Extraction, Tool-Based Exfiltration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (11)

Direct Prompt Extraction

High

• Category: System Prompt Leakage

Content

- `keywords` are treated as required terms (`AND`).
- `exclude` values are treated as blocked terms.

## Output Guidelines

- Surface the top matches first (newest first unless user asks otherwise).
- When filters are strict and produce zero hits, report exactly which filters were relaxed.

• Confidence: 85% confidence
• Finding: Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

- Example:

  ```bash
  curl 'https://api.animes.garden/'
  ```

## 2. Resource APIs

• Confidence: 60% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

- Example:

  ```bash
  curl 'https://api.animes.garden/'
  ```

## 2. Resource APIs

• Confidence: 50% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

- Example:

  ```bash
  curl 'https://api.animes.garden/'
  ```

## 2. Resource APIs

• Confidence: 50% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

- Example:

  ```bash
  curl 'https://api.animes.garden/'
  ```

## 2. Resource APIs

• Confidence: 50% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

- Example:

  ```bash
  curl 'https://api.animes.garden/'
  ```

## 2. Resource APIs

• Confidence: 50% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

- Example:

  ```bash
  curl 'https://api.animes.garden/'
  ```

## 2. Resource APIs

• Confidence: 50% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

- Example:

  ```bash
  curl 'https://api.animes.garden/'
  ```

## 2. Resource APIs

• Confidence: 50% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

- Example:

  ```bash
  curl 'https://api.animes.garden/'
  ```

## 2. Resource APIs

• Confidence: 50% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Scope Creep

Low

• Category: Excessive Agency

Content

THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY
APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT
HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY
OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM
IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.

Scope Creep

Low

• Category: Excessive Agency

Content

THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY
APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT
HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY
OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM
IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.