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Security audit

PRECC

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is not proven malicious, but it asks users to run a mutable remote installer that adds a persistent Claude hook capable of rewriting future Bash commands and using broad local history/context data.

Review this carefully before installing. Only install if you trust the publisher and are comfortable with a persistent Claude hook that can alter Bash commands before execution. Prefer a version-pinned, inspectable, verified installer, review the exact `~/.claude/settings.json` changes, keep backups, avoid `precc ingest --all` on sensitive histories, and confirm there is a clear uninstall and data-deletion path.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • System PersistenceInstalls backdoors, hooks, services, or scheduled tasks that survive the run
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (3)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:101
Finding

Unpinned Remote Installer Is Executed Directly Through Bash

Content
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Remediation
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install.sh" | sha256sum --check - less install.sh bash install.sh ``` The actual URL, version, and digest must be immutable and independently authenticated. ]]>

T06 · System Persistence

Error
Location
SKILL.md:105
Finding

Installer Establishes a Persistent PreToolUse Command-Interception Hook

Content
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Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:52
Finding

Broad Session-History and Agent-Context Access Lacks Documented Scope Controls

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (8)

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill declares access to ~/.claude/settings.json, which is a sensitive agent configuration file controlling hooks and runtime behavior. Modifying agent config can establish persistent execution, alter trust boundaries, or silently intercept future tool invocations, making this especially sensitive in a skill that installs a hook.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

md
config:
        - ~/.local/share/precc/history.db
        - ~/.local/share/precc/heuristics.db
        - ~/.claude/settings.json
      env:
        - PRECC_LICENSE_KEY
    primaryEnv: PRECC_LICENSE_KEY

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Fetching and executing an external install script from a remote domain introduces a high-risk supply-chain and remote-code-execution vector. Even if the script currently verifies downloaded binaries, the initial script itself runs with the user's privileges before any independent trust validation is possible.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 101)May include surrounding context.

Install

bash
curl -fsSL https://peria.ai/install.sh | bash
precc init

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The '| bash' chain removes the user's opportunity to inspect the fetched content and immediately executes whatever the remote endpoint returns. In a skill that also installs hooks and edits agent configuration, this chaining meaningfully increases the blast radius because compromise can lead to both arbitrary code execution and durable agent persistence.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 101)May include surrounding context.

Install

bash
curl -fsSL https://peria.ai/install.sh | bash
precc init

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This section explicitly states that installation configures a PreToolUse hook in ~/.claude/settings.json. Because hooks execute during future agent operations, this is effectively persistence inside the agent environment and could be abused to monitor, modify, or redirect subsequent commands and data flows.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 105)May include surrounding context.

precc init

text

The install script downloads a platform-specific binary from GitHub Releases, verifies its SHA256 checksum, and places it in `~/.local/bin`. It then configures a PreToolUse hook in `~/.claude/settings.json`.

## Live Status Line

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The statusLine command configuration in ~/.claude/settings.json causes a local binary to run repeatedly within the agent UI context. While presented as observability, any command embedded in agent config creates an execution surface that can be repurposed for persistence, data access, or misleading output if the binary is replaced or behaves unexpectedly.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 120)May include surrounding context.

  • Tokens saved — estimated token savings from all corrections
  • Hook latency — average hook execution time

To enable manually, add to ~/.claude/settings.json:

json
{
  "statusLine": {

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill openly states it modifies ~/.claude/settings.json to add a PreToolUse hook entry, confirming persistent changes to agent configuration. In this skill's context, that is more dangerous because the core feature is command interception and correction before execution, giving the installed component influence over future shell behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 132)May include surrounding context.

md
## What PRECC Modifies

- **`~/.claude/settings.json`** — Adds a `PreToolUse` hook entry pointing to `precc-hook`
- **`~/.local/share/precc/`** — SQLite databases for learned failure-fix patterns and skill heuristics
- **`~/.local/bin/`** — Installs `precc`, `precc-hook`, and `precc-learner` binaries

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill is marked user-invocable but does not define narrow activation boundaries or concrete trigger phrases. In an agent context, broad invocation semantics can cause the skill to run in unintended situations, increasing the chance that risky behaviors like installation steps, hook setup, or config modification are suggested or applied without clear user intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The install instructions recommend piping a remotely fetched script directly into bash without an adjacent warning or inspection step. This creates a direct code-execution path from a remote server, so compromise of the host, DNS, TLS trust chain, or release workflow could lead to arbitrary command execution on the user's machine.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.