T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:15- Finding
User Request Scope Override Through Skill Instructions
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is not executable malware, but it asks agents to collect and retain sensitive employee profiling data with weak consent, privacy, and scope controls.
Review carefully before installing. Use only with explicit consent from every person whose birth or workplace data is processed, avoid submitting names or employment identifiers to external charting sites, disable MEMORY.md and default report archival unless there is an approved retention policy, and do not use these profiles as a sole basis for employment decisions.
SKILL.md:15User Request Scope Override Through Skill Instructions
SKILL.md:26External Disclosure of Sensitive Personal and Employment-Linked Data
SKILL.md:181Persistent Storage and Onward Sharing of Identifiable Personnel Profiles Without Safeguards
SKILL.md:14Runtime Mutation of the Trusted Skill Instruction File
The skill instructs collection of highly sensitive personal data, including precise birth date/time, sex, and workplace relationship details, without any visible privacy notice, consent flow, or handling limitations. In a people-management context, this data can enable intrusive profiling, discrimination, or unauthorized workplace decision-making if processed without clear safeguards.
The skill directs persistent storage of personnel reports and memory records without warning users about retention, access, or disclosure. Because these records concern employee traits, weaknesses, and management strategies, undisclosed persistence materially raises the risk of privacy violations, insider misuse, and harmful downstream employment decisions.
The skill is described as generating a Ziwei-based people-management report from chart input, but its documented workflow expands scope to collecting birth date/time, sex, organizational role, reporting lines, and recent incidents. That is a material increase in data collection beyond a simple report-generation claim, and it creates privacy and misuse risk because the extra personnel context is sensitive and directly tied to workplace evaluation.
The manifest presents the skill as report generation, but the instructions additionally require writing reports to local files, updating MEMORY.md, and potentially forwarding outputs for review. That changes the skill from transient analysis to persistent storage and distribution of employee profiles, increasing confidentiality, retention, and secondary-use risk without clear disclosure.
Long-term archival of personnel reports and memory updates is not inherently necessary to produce a one-time Ziwei analysis report. Retaining detailed profiles creates an avoidable stockpile of sensitive employee data that can later be searched, reused, or leaked for purposes unrelated to the original request.
Instructions to write detailed personal reports into local archives and a memory file create a natural-language data retention and leakage risk even without executable code. Sensitive HR-style notes about individuals can be exposed through filesystem access, later prompt retrieval, backups, or accidental sharing, especially when the skill normalizes permanent accumulation.
The entire report template is written in Chinese, beginning with the title on L001 and continuing throughout all section headings and field labels. This imposes a specific language/locale on generated output, and the file does not indicate that the user can choose another language or explicitly opt in to Chinese.