T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
references/selfhost-setup.md:57- Finding
Mutable, Unverified Remote Payloads Are Downloaded and Executed
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This appears to be a real shared-memory integration, but it handles credentials, imports, and sharing with too much automatic authority and too little user review.
Review carefully before installing. Use a self-hosted or trusted endpoint when possible, do not paste another user's API key for sharing, avoid displaying full API keys in chat, preview any files before importing, and pin or verify packages, Docker images, and release binaries before running them.
references/selfhost-setup.md:57Mutable, Unverified Remote Payloads Are Downloaded and Executed
SKILL.md:62Bearer API Keys Are Reused and Requested as Cross-User Identifiers
SKILL.md:253Automatic Workspace Scanning Can Bulk-Upload Sensitive Session Files Without File-Level Approval
SKILL.md:166Setup Handoff Requires Displaying the Full Bearer API Key in Chat
The description promises a broad persistent-memory skill with onboarding, storage/recall, sharing, analytics, import/export, and deployment-related use cases. The actual code chunk is much narrower: it is a diagnostic script for verifying that an ourmem service is reachable, authenticated, and able to store/search/delete a test memory. While this is related to 'memory not working' or setup validation, it does not substantiate the broader declared functionality and has a materially different primary purpose from the full skill description. Therefore this chunk does not accurately represent the declared behavior.
The trigger phrases are broad everyday language such as 'remember this' and 'save this for later', which can cause the skill to activate in many normal conversations where persistent storage was not intended. In this skill, activation can lead to networked persistence and sharing behavior, so over-triggering materially raises privacy and consent risks.
The manifest explicitly instructs activation even when the user does not mention the product, based only on ambiguous memory-related intent. Given the skill's ability to persist data across sessions and share it externally, this increases the risk of silently turning ordinary chat content into long-lived or shared records.
The skill directs modification of agent configuration files such as ~/.claude/settings.json, which are sensitive because they can alter agent behavior and often contain secrets or environment configuration. Changing files in an agent config directory is high risk if not tightly scoped and explicitly approved, as it can persist capabilities or leak credentials.
| Platform | Install | Config |
|----------|---------|--------|
| Claude Code | `/plugin marketplace add ourmem/omem` | `~/.claude/settings.json` env field |
| OpenCode | `"plugin": ["@ourmem/opencode"]` in opencode.json | `plugin_config` in opencode.json |
| OpenClaw | `openclaw plugins install @ourmem/ourmem` | `openclaw.json` with apiUrl + apiKey |
| MCP | `npx -y @ourmem/mcp` in MCP config | `OMEM_API_URL` + `OMEM_API_KEY` in env block |
Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.
## Update
Do not set up automatic daily self-updates for this skill.
Only update the local skill file when the user or maintainer explicitly asks for a refresh from a reviewed source.
The skill directs the agent to access and modify ~/.claude/settings.json, a sensitive agent configuration location. Access to agent config directories is high risk because it can alter agent behavior, persist secrets, and create lasting changes outside the current task scope.
[AGENT] Write credentials to ~/.claude/settings.json (Claude Code's native config):
python3 -c "
The embedded Python command opens and rewrites ~/.claude/settings.json, confirming direct programmatic modification of a privileged agent configuration file. Such automated access is dangerous because it can silently persist behavior changes and secrets in a trusted location that influences future agent sessions.
python3 -c "
import json, os
p = os.path.expanduser('~/.claude/settings.json')
try: d = json.load(open(p))
except: d = {}
d.setdefault('env', {})
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
git clone https://github.com/ourmem/omem.git
cd omem
cp .env.example .env
docker-compose up -d
The instructions target an agent configuration file in the user's home directory and direct the agent to modify it with credentials. Accessing and changing agent config paths is sensitive because it establishes durable trust/configuration state that can outlive the current session and may be abused if done without clear consent and safeguards.
[AGENT] Write credentials to ~/.claude/settings.json (Claude Code's native config):
python3 -c "
The embedded Python snippet programmatically edits ~/.claude/settings.json, which is a high-trust configuration location. Automating writes to such files can silently alter agent behavior and persist sensitive values beyond the intended setup flow.
python3 -c "
import json, os
p = os.path.expanduser('~/.claude/settings.json')
try: d = json.load(open(p))
except: d = {}
d.setdefault('env', {})
The skill clearly instructs the agent to run shell commands such as curl, npx, and plugin installers, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope or allowed-tools boundary. That increases the chance an agent executes command-capable actions without clear sandboxing or consent expectations, especially during onboarding and troubleshooting flows.
Using an unpinned npx package reference means the executed code can change over time and may resolve to a compromised or unexpected version at install time. This creates a software supply-chain risk because the skill encourages direct execution of remote package code without version immutability.
The skill recommends running npx -y @ourmem/mcp without a pinned version, which executes remote package code immediately and non-interactively. Because this is an MCP component that may be granted broad agent access, a compromised upstream package could result in arbitrary code execution or credential exposure.
The cross-user sharing API transmits stored memory content to another user's space via a remote service. Although sharing is a core product feature, it is still a real external transmission risk because mistaken identity, wrong target user IDs, or overbroad sharing could disclose sensitive data beyond the original user boundary.
The agent should call share-to-user which auto-creates a bridging Team Space if needed, adds the target user as a member, and shares the memory in one step.
curl -sX POST "$API_URL/v1/memories/MEMORY_ID/share-to-user" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "X-API-Key: $KEY" \
-d '{"target_user": "TARGET_USER_TENANT_ID"}'
# Returns: { "space_id": "team/xxx", "shared_copy_id": "yyy", "space_created": true }
The skill tells the agent to scan the user's workspace for memory/session files and upload them, but it does not require an explicit warning or informed consent before accessing local data. This can expose sensitive project files, transcripts, or metadata to the agent and then to the remote memory service.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# Create tenant (returns API key)
curl -sX POST $API_URL/v1/tenants \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "my-workspace"}'
# -> {"id": "...", "api_key": "...", "status": "active"}
The quick reference documents cross-space and cross-user sharing endpoints without any warning about privacy boundaries, authorization expectations, or the risk of propagating sensitive memories to other users or teams. In a memory-sharing product, examples that normalize broad sharing can lead integrators to expose personal, confidential, or tenant-scoped data through misuse or overbroad automation.
The GitHub connector example encourages submission of an access token directly in a request body but does not warn that this credential is highly sensitive and must be stored, rotated, and scoped carefully. Users may copy this pattern into logs, client-side code, or insecure transport paths, leading to repository compromise if the token is exposed.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# -> {"id": "...", "status": "completed|partial|failed", ...}
# Trigger intelligence on past import
curl -sX POST "$API_URL/v1/imports/IMPORT_ID/intelligence" -H "X-API-Key: $KEY"
# Cross-reconcile (discover relations via vector similarity)
curl -sX POST $API_URL/v1/imports/cross-reconcile -H "X-API-Key: $KEY"
The rollback and batch deletion examples demonstrate broad destructive operations, including delete-all, without prominent warnings about data loss, confirmation semantics, or operational safeguards. In a persistent memory system, operators may accidentally erase large datasets or trigger irreversible cleanup through automation, copy-paste usage, or misunderstood filters.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -sX POST https://api.ourmem.ai/v1/tenants \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "my-workspace"}' | jq .
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -sX POST https://api.ourmem.ai/v1/tenants \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "my-workspace"}' | jq .
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -sX POST https://api.ourmem.ai/v1/tenants \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "my-workspace"}' | jq .
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -sX POST https://api.ourmem.ai/v1/tenants \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "my-workspace"}' | jq .
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -sX POST https://api.ourmem.ai/v1/tenants \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "my-workspace"}' | jq .