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Security audit

MiniMax Multimodal Toolkit

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This MiniMax media-generation skill mostly does what it claims, but its scripts can send your API key and uploaded media to any configured API host instead of only MiniMax's official hosts.

Install only if you are comfortable running local shell scripts that process media and call MiniMax APIs. Before use, set MINIMAX_API_HOST only to https://api.minimaxi.com or https://api.minimax.io, inspect any project .env file, and do not run the optional API test or generation scripts if the host is nonstandard. Rotate your MiniMax API key if you already ran these scripts with an unexpected host.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/tts/generate_voice.sh:69
Finding

Unrestricted API Host Allows Disclosure of Bearer Credentials and User Media

Content
View full analysis
/dev/null)" || { echo "Error: curl request failed" >&2 exit 1 } ``` Voice-cloning uploads also send the bearer credential and the selected local file to the configured host: ```bash api_upload() { # api_upload ENDPOINT FILE_PATH PURPOSE local endpoint="$1" file_path="$2" purpose="$3" local url="${API_BASE}/${endpoint#/}" local output http_code response output="$(curl -s -w "\n%{http_code}" \ -X POST \ -H "Authorization: Bearer ${MINIMAX_API_KEY}" \ -H "Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate" \ --compressed \ -F "file=@${file_path}" \ -F "purpose=${purpose}" \ --max-time 120 \ "$url" 2>/dev/null)" || { echo "Error: cur ...[truncated 4815 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
&2 return 1 ;; esac } ``` 3. **Call host validation immediately before every authenticated request.** Do not rely solely on a separate environment-checking command, because users may invoke generation scripts directly. 4. **Restrict protocols and redirect behavior in `curl`.** Use controls such as: ```bash curl \ --proto '=https' \ --proto-redir '=https' \ --max-redirs 0 \ ... ``` If redirects are required by a documented API operation, validate the redirect destination before forwarding credentials. Do not use credential-forwarding options such as `--location-trusted`. 5. **Reject malformed or expanded origins.** Do not accept unexpected ports, URL user information, query strings, fragments, alternate host spellings, or subdomains. Compare a normalized origin rather than using substring or suffix matching. 6. **Reduce trust in workspace configuration.** Do not automatically use a current-working-directory `.env` to determine credential destinations. Prefer explicit process configuration or a trusted, permission-restricted configuration file. If `.env` support is retained, ignore destination overrides unless they pass the exact allowlist. 7. **Separate credentialed API requests from media downloads.** ...[truncated 747 chars]
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (64)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill prescribes rm -rf minimax-output/tmp, a destructive recursive delete pattern. Although the path is intended to be fixed, any path confusion, symlink abuse, or execution from an unexpected working directory could delete unintended files, and the skill normalizes use of dangerous shell deletion in agent workflows.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

md
1. Before running any script, ensure `minimax-output/` exists in the agent's working directory (create if needed: `mkdir -p minimax-output`)
2. Always use absolute or relative paths from the agent's working directory: `--output minimax-output/video.mp4`
3. **Never** `cd` into the skill directory to run scripts — run from the agent's working directory using the full script path
4. Intermediate/temp files (segment audio, video segments, extracted frames) are automatically placed in `minimax-output/tmp/`. They can be cleaned up when no longer needed: `rm -rf minimax-output/tmp`

## Prerequisites

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 72)May include surrounding context.

md
| TTS | Text-to-speech synthesis with multiple voices and emotions | `scripts/tts/generate_voice.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 73)May include surrounding context.

md
| TTS | Text-to-speech synthesis with multiple voices and emotions | `scripts/tts/generate_voice.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 74)May include surrounding context.

md
| TTS | Text-to-speech synthesis with multiple voices and emotions | `scripts/tts/generate_voice.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 83)May include surrounding context.

md
| TTS | Text-to-speech synthesis with multiple voices and emotions | `scripts/tts/generate_voice.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 102)May include surrounding context.

md
| TTS | Text-to-speech synthesis with multiple voices and emotions | `scripts/tts/generate_voice.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 103)May include surrounding context.

md
| TTS | Text-to-speech synthesis with multiple voices and emotions | `scripts/tts/generate_voice.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 119)May include surrounding context.

md
| TTS | Text-to-speech synthesis with multiple voices and emotions | `scripts/tts/generate_voice.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 129)May include surrounding context.

md
| TTS | Text-to-speech synthesis with multiple voices and emotions | `scripts/tts/generate_voice.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 132)May include surrounding context.

md
| TTS | Text-to-speech synthesis with multiple voices and emotions | `scripts/tts/generate_voice.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 135)May include surrounding context.

md
| TTS | Text-to-speech synthesis with multiple voices and emotions | `scripts/tts/generate_voice.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 141)May include surrounding context.

md
| TTS | Text-to-speech synthesis with multiple voices and emotions | `scripts/tts/generate_voice.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 142)May include surrounding context.

md
| TTS | Text-to-speech synthesis with multiple voices and emotions | `scripts/tts/generate_voice.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 78)May include surrounding context.

md
| Long Video | Multi-scene chained video with crossfade transitions | `scripts/video/generate_long_video.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 377)May include surrounding context.

md
| Long Video | Multi-scene chained video with crossfade transitions | `scripts/video/generate_long_video.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 379)May include surrounding context.

md
| Long Video | Multi-scene chained video with crossfade transitions | `scripts/video/generate_long_video.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 382)May include surrounding context.

md
| Long Video | Multi-scene chained video with crossfade transitions | `scripts/video/generate_long_video.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 489)May include surrounding context.

md
| Long Video | Multi-scene chained video with crossfade transitions | `scripts/video/generate_long_video.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 498)May include surrounding context.

md
| Long Video | Multi-scene chained video with crossfade transitions | `scripts/video/generate_long_video.sh` |

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 510)May include surrounding context.

md
bash scripts/video/add_bgm.sh \

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/image/generate_image.sh (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

sh
load_env() {
  local env_file
  for env_file in "$PROJECT_ROOT/.env" "$(pwd)/.env"; do
    if [[ -f "$env_file" ]]; then
      while IFS= read -r line || [[ -n "$line" ]]; do
        line="${line%%#*}"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/music/generate_music.sh (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

sh
load_env() {
  local env_file
  for env_file in "$PROJECT_ROOT/.env" "$(pwd)/.env"; do
    if [[ -f "$env_file" ]]; then
      while IFS= read -r line || [[ -n "$line" ]]; do
        line="${line%%#*}"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/tts/generate_voice.sh (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

sh
load_env() {
  local env_file
  for env_file in "$PROJECT_ROOT/.env" "$(pwd)/.env"; do
    if [[ -f "$env_file" ]]; then
      while IFS= read -r line || [[ -n "$line" ]]; do
        line="${line%%#*}"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/video/add_bgm.sh (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

sh
load_env() {
  local env_file
  for env_file in "$PROJECT_ROOT/.env" "$(pwd)/.env"; do
    if [[ -f "$env_file" ]]; then
      while IFS= read -r line || [[ -n "$line" ]]; do
        line="${line%%#*}"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/video/generate_template_video.sh (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

sh
load_env() {
  local env_file
  for env_file in "$PROJECT_ROOT/.env" "$(pwd)/.env"; do
    if [[ -f "$env_file" ]]; then
      while IFS= read -r line || [[ -n "$line" ]]; do
        line="${line%%#*}"

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.