T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Error
- Location
- scripts/diary_force.py:457
- Finding
- Overbroad Git Staging Can Upload Unrelated Private Files<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/diary_force.py:457-458`, duplicated at `scripts/diary_force.py:490-491` and `scripts/think.py:125-126` **Vulnerability Type**: Excessive repository access and unintended data disclosure **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```python # Git push os.chdir(MEMORY_PATH.parent) os.system('git add . && git commit -m "memory: sync {}" && git push'.format(date)) ``` The same behavior appears in the dated finalization path: ```python # Git push os.chdir(MEMORY_PATH.parent) os.system(f'git add . && git commit -m "memory: sync {date}" && git push') ``` It is also used by the analysis workflow: ```python def git_push(date: str): """Git push""" os.chdir(MEMORY_PATH.parent) os.system('git add . && git commit -m "memory: sync {}" && git push'.format(date)) ``` ### Technical Analysis `MEMORY_PATH` is configured as a subdirectory: ```python MEMORY_PATH = Path("D:/ObsidianVault/ChuQuan/memory") ``` Before committing, the code changes the working directory to `MEMORY_PATH.parent`, which is the broader `ChuQuan` vault, and executes `git add .`. This stages every changed, unignored file below that repository directory rather than only the generated memory entry. The subsequent `git commit` and `git push` operations can therefore send unrelated personal notes, configuration files, documents, or credentials to the repository's configured remote. The operation is automatic and does not display the staged diff or request confirmation. ### Attack Path 1. A sensitive or attacker-selected file is created or modified anywhere below `D:/ObsidianVault/ChuQuan`. 2. The file is not excluded by `.gitignore`. 3. The user completes a diary or runs the analysis workflow. 4. The skill changes into the vault root. 5. `git add .` stages the sensitive file together with the generated diary content. 6. `git commit` records all staged files. 7. `git push` uploads the commit using the user's existing Git credentials ...[truncated 838 chars]
- Remediation
- <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions Stage only the file generated by the current operation and invoke Git without a command shell: ```python import subprocess repository = MEMORY_PATH.parent relative_memory_file = memory_file.relative_to(repository) subprocess.run( ["git", "-C", str(repository), "add", "--", str(relative_memory_file)], check=True, ) subprocess.run( ["git", "-C", str(repository), "commit", "-m", f"memory: sync {date}"], check=True, ) subprocess.run( ["git", "-C", str(repository), "push"], check=True, ) ``` Additional hardening should include: 1. Verify that the generated file resolves inside the expected memory directory. 2. Never use `git add .`, `git add -A`, or equivalent repository-wide staging. 3. Inspect `git diff --cached --name-only` and reject any unexpected path before committing. 4. Require explicit user confirmation before the first remote push and whenever unexpected staged changes exist. 5. Check whether unrelated changes were already staged before the skill started; do not include them in the skill's commit. 6. Maintain a restrictive `.gitignore`, while treating it only as defense in depth. 7. Report the actual return status of every Git operation instead of always claiming that the push completed. 8. If sensitive data was already pushed, rotate exposed credentials and purge the data from Git history and all remote copies. ]]>