T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
scripts/diary_force.py:457- Finding
Overbroad Git Staging Can Upload Unrelated Private Files
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This diary skill has a coherent purpose, but it can automatically persist and push sensitive diary and unrelated vault files to Git without adequate scoping or confirmation.
Install only if you are comfortable with diary text being written into local files, sent to an external OpenCode-backed model for analysis, committed into Git history, and pushed to the configured remote. Before using it, change the hardcoded paths, remove or disable automatic git push, replace git add . with staging only the intended file, and require review before any commit or upload.
scripts/diary_force.py:457Overbroad Git Staging Can Upload Unrelated Private Files
scripts/think.py:59OpenCode Invocation Uses an Unnecessary Command Shell with User-Controlled Content
The Chinese description likewise omits or understates sensitive behaviors such as Git commits, remote push, and cross-directory persistence while emphasizing reminder and reflection features. In a diary context, such omissions materially increase privacy risk because personal reflections may be stored and propagated beyond the user's immediate expectation.
The Chinese description likewise omits or understates sensitive behaviors such as Git commits, remote push, and cross-directory persistence while emphasizing reminder and reflection features. In a diary context, such omissions materially increase privacy risk because personal reflections may be stored and propagated beyond the user's immediate expectation.
The workflow states that diary content may be analyzed via an external tool and then archived with Git, but the user-facing description lacks a clear upfront warning that private diary text will leave the immediate interaction boundary and be persisted. For intimate personal content, this creates a substantial confidentiality risk and undermines informed consent.
The skill is explicitly designed to retain, duplicate, and 'internalize' user diary content into a separate memory store and then sync it remotely. In a diary context, this creates a significant privacy risk because highly personal data is being copied to multiple locations under soft, non-transparent wording.
The manifest presents the skill as a diary reminder and analysis tool, but the code also synchronizes diary contents to a Git remote. That hidden expansion of capability is dangerous because users may share intimate personal reflections without realizing they will be transmitted and stored outside the local diary path.
The skill pushes diary content to a Git remote without an explicit warning that personal data will leave the local machine. In the context of a diary assistant, covert or insufficiently disclosed network transmission of intimate reflections is a severe privacy and data-exfiltration risk.
Executing shell-based Git operations is not justified by the stated function of a habit-forming diary assistant. In this context, the extra capability is more dangerous because the tool handles highly sensitive user data and can unexpectedly stage, commit, and transmit it beyond the local system.
The skill executes a shell command via os.system() to add, commit, and push diary contents to Git. Even though the interpolated date is usually locally generated, shell execution is unnecessary and dangerous for a diary tool, and this path transmits highly sensitive personal data to a remote repository without strong safety controls.
# Git push
os.chdir(MEMORY_PATH.parent)
os.system('git add . && git commit -m "memory: sync {}" && git push'.format(date))
return f"""
✅ **日记已完成!**
The alternate finalization path repeats the same risky behavior: it saves diary contents and pushes them to a remote repository without advance user-facing disclosure. Because this path accepts a date argument and performs the same sync automatically, it broadens the chance of unintended export of sensitive personal data.
This os.system() call interpolates a user-supplied date into a shell command. Although datetime.strptime validates format, invoking a shell for Git operations remains an unsafe pattern, and the function also pushes private diary content to a remote repository with no explicit consent at the point of transmission.
# Git push
os.chdir(MEMORY_PATH.parent)
os.system(f'git add . && git commit -m "memory: sync {date}" && git push')
msg = f"""
✅日记已完成!
The skill executes external commands both for model invocation and for git operations, capabilities that exceed what is strictly necessary for diary reminder/analysis and introduce execution and exfiltration risks. In this context, the danger is higher because the processed content is highly personal diary text and the side effects include persistent file modification and possible remote sync.
The tool call forwards raw user input into an external model invocation with broad instruction context and no validation, review, or containment, enabling prompt-driven misuse of the downstream tool and uncontrolled transmission of sensitive content. While the subprocess arguments are not directly shell-injected here, this is still parameter abuse because untrusted diary text is passed into a powerful external analysis channel without guardrails.
prompt = THINKING_PROMPT.format(user_input=user_input)
try:
result = subprocess.run(
["opencode", "run", "--model", "opencode/minimax-m2.5-free", prompt],
input="",
capture_output=True,
The script automatically stages, commits, and pushes memory repository content without warning the user that local personal notes may be synchronized to a remote repository. In a diary tool, this is particularly dangerous because it can expose highly sensitive personal reflections beyond the local machine with a single run.
The script invokes a shell via os.system() to run git add/commit/push, which is dangerous because shell execution expands the attack surface and can publish local diary/memory content to a remote repository without an explicit confirmation step. Even though the date string is locally generated and not directly attacker-controlled, the behavior still performs sensitive side effects and relies on shell parsing unnecessarily.
def git_push(date: str):
"""Git push"""
os.chdir(MEMORY_PATH.parent)
os.system('git add . && git commit -m "memory: sync {}" && git push'.format(date))
def run_analysis(user_input: str):
The title, tagline, and all usage documentation are presented only in Chinese, with no indication that users can opt into another language or that the skill is intentionally restricted to a Chinese-only audience for compliance or regional reasons. This matches the stated policy concern for language or locale restrictions without user opt-in.
The README promotes automatic nightly diary prompting and memory archival for highly personal journal content, but provides no privacy notice, data handling description, retention policy, or consent guidance. Because diaries may contain sensitive mental health, relationship, work, or credential-related information, unattended collection and archival materially increase the risk of unexpected disclosure or over-collection.
The documented cron configuration causes the skill to run unattended every night and process personal journal data, yet the README does not warn users that scheduled execution may trigger automatic handling of sensitive content without a contemporaneous confirmation step. In the context of diary software, silent scheduled execution increases the chance of privacy surprises, unintended transmission to analysis components, and collection beyond user expectations.
The skill describes file reads, file writes, and shell/Git operations but does not declare any explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. This is dangerous because a runtime may grant broader capabilities than users expect, enabling local diary access, persistence, and command execution without transparent consent or least-privilege controls.
The skill explicitly instructs persistent internalization and archival of diary content and derived insights. In the context of personal journaling, this is dangerous because it increases retention of sensitive emotional, behavioral, and situational data beyond the immediate task, expanding exposure in case of local compromise, sync, or accidental sharing.
The trigger conditions are broad enough to activate on common phrases about journaling, reflection, low energy, or emotional fluctuation. In practice this can cause unintended invocation of a skill that reads/writes private diary data and may launch external analysis or archival steps without the user deliberately choosing that workflow.
The memory write and Git archival behavior is described as a normal workflow step without a strong privacy or integrity warning. Because memory extraction can distill sensitive personal insights into long-lived files and version history, users may unknowingly create durable records that are difficult to delete and easy to overexpose.
The instructions direct extraction of key insights from diaries into memory files and committing them to version control, creating durable plain-language records of potentially sensitive personal information. Git history can preserve secrets and intimate content even after later edits, making downstream disclosure and cleanup materially harder.
The eval prompts describe actions that can trigger file checks, interactive journaling, external tool use, memory writes, and Git commits, but they do not define clear activation boundaries, authorization checks, or confirmation requirements. In a forceful habit-building skill, broad prompts like checking whether a diary exists or internalizing entries into memory can cause unintended execution on loosely related user input, leading to privacy-invasive or state-changing behavior.
The eval explicitly expects the system to write derived memory entries into the memory/ directory and perform a Git commit, both of which are persistent state changes, without any warning, consent, or review step. Because this skill handles intimate diary content, automatic persistence and versioning can expose sensitive personal information, create irreversible history, and surprise users who only asked for analysis or journaling assistance.
The file header and interaction design are written as if the skill operates in Chinese by default, and the CLI prompts also instruct the user exclusively in Chinese. The policy explicitly flags language or locale constraints when they are imposed without user choice or justification.